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ARTICLE

Unlawfully-Issued Sovereign Debt
W. MARK C. WEIDEMAIER & MITU GULATI*
In 2016, its economy in shambles and looking to defer payment on its debts, the
Venezuelan government of Nicolás Maduro proposed a multi-billion dollar debt swap to
holders of bonds issued by the government’s crown jewel, state-owned oil company Petroleós
de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA). A new government now challenges that bond issuance,
arguing that it was unlawful under Venezuelan law. Bondholders counter that this does
not matter, that PDVSA freed itself of any borrowing limits by agreeing to a choice-oflaw clause designating New York law.
The dispute over the PDVSA 2020 bonds implicates a common problem. Sovereign
nations borrow under constraints imposed by their own laws. Loans that violate these
constraints may be deemed invalid. Does an international bond—i.e., one expressly made
subject to the law of a different jurisdiction—protect investors against that risk? The
answer depends on the text of the loan’s choice-of-law clause, as interpreted against the
backdrop of the forum’s rules for resolving conflict of laws problems.
We show that the choice-of-law clauses in many international sovereign bonds—
especially when issued under New York law—use language that may expose investors to
greater risk. We document the frequent use of “carve-outs” that could be interpreted to
require the application of the sovereign’s local law to a wide range of issues. If interpreted
in this way, these clauses materially reduce the protection ostensibly offered by an
international bond. We explain why we think a narrower interpretation is more
appropriate. We close by exploring implications of our findings, including for the dispute
over the PDVSA 2020 bonds.

* University of North Carolina School of Law and Duke University School of Law, respectively.
Thanks to John Coyle for comments and suggestions on earlier drafts and to Renxiang Wei for research
assistance. We also owe a large debt to the twenty senior sovereign debt lawyers who took the time to
discuss the core questions in our paper with us. For reasons of confidentially—and given that the
matters discussed here are in litigation that might implicate some of their law firms—we cannot thank
them by name or share the notes with the editors. Responsibility for the accuracy of what we report
on that score therefore is solely ours. The research was done under the Duke Human Subjects Protocol
1192.
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INTRODUCTION

In 2016, its economy in shambles and looking to defer payment on its
debts, the Venezuelan government of Nicolás Maduro proposed a multibillion dollar debt swap to holders of bonds issued by the government’s
crown jewel, state-owned oil company Petroleós de Venezuela S.A.
(PDVSA). In exchange for the outstanding bonds, which were soon to
mature, bondholders received new bonds that did not mature until 2020. To
sweeten the deal, the new bonds, unlike the old, were secured. As collateral,
the government pledged fifty-one percent of the equity in Citgo, PDVSA’s
wholly-owned oil refining company in Texas.1
Now, in 2020, Venezuela’s economic crisis has deepened and the
PDVSA 2020 bonds are in default. Bondholders want to seize the collateral.
Desperate not to lose the country’s most valuable foreign asset, a new
government claims that its predecessor could not lawfully pledge the Citgo
shares.2 Under Venezuelan law, contracts in the “national public interest”
must be approved by the legislature. 3 The Maduro regime did not seek
approval, expecting perhaps that the opposition-controlled legislature
would not grant it. The new government asked a federal judge in New York
to invalidate the bonds and collateral pledge, allowing it to retain control
over Citgo, which the government characterizes as indispensable to the
country’s economic recovery.4 But there is a problem with this argument.
The PDVSA 2020 bonds include a choice-of-law clause stipulating that the
1. See Mary Anastasia O’Grady, Bondholders and Venezuelan Democracy, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 13, 2019),
https://tinyurl.com/5ywc4wer; Offering 50% of Citgo Venezuela’s PDVSA Gets $2.8 Billion of $7.1 Billion
in Debt Holders to Extend, LATIN AM. HERALD TRIB. (2016), https://tinyurl.com/7pu6krxf.
2. Although Nicolás Maduro is still in charge in Caracas, the United States government recognizes
opposition leader Juan Guaidó as interim president. See Press Release, U.S. Embassy & Consulate in
Ecuador, Statement from President Donald J. Trump Recognizing Venezuelan National Assembly
President Juan Guaido as the Interim President of Venezuela (Jan. 23, 2019),
https://tinyurl.com/becj8njd. Historically, PDVSA’s oil exports generated ninety-five percent of
Venezuela’s foreign currency earnings. See Gillian B. White & Bourree Lam, What’s at Stake in
Venezuela’s Economic Crisis, ATLANTIC (July 5, 2016), https://tinyurl.com/2y7h7azb. And, at least
before the current U.S. sanctions regime blocked transactions, Citgo was a key source of both dollars
and refined fuel for Venezuela. See Clifford Krauss, Venezuela’s Crisis Imperils Citgo, its American ‘Cash
Cow,’ N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2018), https://tinyurl.com/yfhhx7uf. Thus, “Citgo is considered critical to
a future recovery of the country’s economy.” Clifford Krauss, Citgo Gets a U.S. Lifeline in Holding off
Creditors, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2019), https://tinyurl.com/zbuyaact.
3. See CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DE VENEZUELA art. 150 (amended 2009).
4. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶ 9, Petróleos de Venez. S.A. v. MUFG
Union Bank, No. 19 Civ. 10023, 2020 WL 7711522 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2019); Andrew Scurria,
Venezuelan Opposition Files Lawsuit Attacking Citgo-Backed Bonds, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 29, 2019),
https://tinyurl.com/ydexkf5h. If the court were to invalidate the collateral pledge only, bondholders
would be left with an unsecured claim. Even an unsecured creditor will eventually threaten the
governments’ control over CITGO; indeed, Canadian mining company Crystallex threatens it now.
The reason is that PDVSA’s only U.S. asset is an equity interest in CITGO’s ultimate U.S. parent
company, and this asset can be attached and sold to satisfy a judgment creditor’s claim. At present,
however, U.S. sanctions prevent such a sale.

556

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 61:3

bonds are to be governed exclusively by the law of New York. The indenture
trustee responded to the government’s suit by arguing that it does not matter
what Venezuelan law says about the country’s ability to borrow. In the
trustee’s view, the country freed itself of domestic borrowing limits by
agreeing to the choice-of-law clause. What matters is the content of New
York law, which, the trustee argues, requires enforcement. 5
The dispute over the PDVSA 2020 bonds implicates a common
problem. When borrowing, sovereign nations operate under legal
constraints imposed by their own laws. These constraints take many forms.
Some limit the amount of debt the sovereign can incur. Others cabin the
borrowing authority of executive branch or finance ministry officials by
requiring a legislature or other political institution to approve loans. Still
others regulate borrowing mechanics such as questions of loan execution—
say, by specifying which official must sign loan-related documents.
Whatever the nature of the constraint, the sovereign’s own law will also
define the consequences of a violation. In some cases, the sovereign may
avoid the obligation to repay entirely.6
Our inquiry is motivated by a desire to understand how these domestic
legal constraints work in international sovereign loans like the PDVSA 2020
bonds. We use the term to refer to loans that are enforceable in foreign
courts or arbitration tribunals and that are governed by foreign law, rather
than by the borrower’s local law.7 Sovereign debt is often bond debt, so we
will mostly use that term (rather than loan) and refer to investors (rather
than lenders). However, our discussion is not limited to any particular form
of borrowing.
An international sovereign bond typically includes a waiver of sovereign
immunity, a clause submitting to the jurisdiction of foreign courts, and a
choice-of-law clause stipulating to the application of foreign law.8 Mostly,
this means New York or English law.9 These contractual provisions work
5. In October, the district judge ruled that the PDVSA 2020 bond was valid and enforceable.
Petróleos de Venez. S.A. v. MUFG Union Bank, No. 19 Civ. 10023, 2020 WL 6135761 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
16, 2020). That decision is now on appeal.
6. For instance, in the U.S. municipal context, see, e.g., Chem. Bank v. Wash. Pub. Power Supply
Sys., 691 P.2d 524 (Wash. 1984), State v. Spring City, 260 P.2d 527 (Utah 1955), and State ex rel. Nuveen
v. Greer, 102 So. 739 (Fla. 1924).
7. See, e.g., CARMEN REINHART & KENNETH A. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT
CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY 9 (2009) (describing external debt as “normally subject to the
jurisdiction of foreign creditors”); Anna Gelpern, Domestic Bonds, Credit Derivatives, and the Next
Transformation of Sovereign Debt, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 147, 149 (2008) (emphasizing the importance of
governing law but also noting the difficulty of drawing neat distinctions between foreign and domestic
borrowing).
8. W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Sovereign Immunity and Sovereign Debt, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 67, 86 n.120;
Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, The Evolution of Contractual Terms in Sovereign Bonds, 4 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 132, 139-40 (2012).
9. See Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott, The Black Hole Problem in Commercial
Boilerplate, 67 DUKE L.J. 1, 25 (2017). Typically, such a loan would also be denominated in a foreign
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together to shield investors from the risk of legal instability, including the
risk that the sovereign will change its law to reduce its payment obligations.10
History teaches that the risk is significant. In the 1930s, as countries
abandoned the gold standard, the United States changed its law to
retroactively eliminate contractual protections indexing bond payments to
gold.11 In 2012, Greece undertook the largest sovereign debt restructuring
in history by passing a law retroactively allowing a subset of bondholders to
agree to a restructuring of the country’s local-law debt and to bind dissenters
to the outcome.12 In 2018 and 2019, Barbados modeled its restructuring of
local-law debt on the Greek template.13
Domestic debt—that is, debt lacking the contractual protections
mentioned above—can readily be restructured using such methods. The
issuing sovereign’s local law may already authorize it to conduct a debt
restructuring without the consent of all creditors; if not, the law can be
changed. 14 And while domestic courts might act to prevent the worst
misuses of this power, they often will defer to political actors in a financial
crisis.15 Indeed, even when the sovereign’s local law incorporates explicit
investor protections, the available evidence suggests that these offer little
value to investors. 16 By contrast, in an international loan, the designated
foreign law and courts will likely place great emphasis on enforcing contracts
in accordance with their terms. In its 2012 debt restructuring, Greece’s
retroactive legal changes affected only its local-law debt. Investors who held
international debt were unaffected, and many escaped the restructuring
altogether.17
currency, although for our purposes the governing law is what matters. For a discussion, see Michael
Bradley et al., Pricing Sovereign Debt: Foreign Versus Local Parameters, 24 EUR. FIN. MGT J. 261 (2018).
10. Choi et al., supra note 8, at 139-40.
11. SEBASTIÁN EDWARDS, AMERICAN DEFAULT: THE UNTOLD STORY OF FDR, THE
SUPREME COURT, AND THE BATTLE OVER GOLD (2018).
12. Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Christoph Trebesch & Mitu Gulati, The Greek Debt Restructuring: An
Autopsy, 28 ECON. POLICY 513, 554 (2013).
13. See Andrew Shutter, Barbados Sovereign Debt Restructuring 2018-2019—Like the Island, Small but
Perfectly Formed, 15 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 250 (2020); Sui-Jim Ho & Edward Crane, Building a Climate Resilient
Debt Portfolio, INT’L FIN. L. REV. (Mar. 20, 2020); Myrvin Anthony, Gregorio Impavido & Bert van
Selm, Barbados 2018-2019 Sovereign Debt Restructuring—A Sea Change? 9-10 (Int’l Monetary Fund,
Working Paper No. WP/20/34, 2020).
14. See, e.g., W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Restructuring Euro Area Sovereign Debt: Have the Options
Narrowed?, 6 J. FIN. REG. 125 (2020).
15. See Mitu Gulati & Georg Vanberg, Paper Tigers: Or How Much Will Courts Protect Rights in a
Financial Crisis? (Duke L. Sch. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Series, Paper No. 2018-45, 2018).
16. Mitu Gulati, Ugo Panizza, W. Mark C. Weidemaier & Gracie Willingham, When Governments
Promise to Prioritize Public Debt, Do Markets Care?, 6 J. FIN. REG 41 (2020).
17. Greece’s international bonds allowed investors to collectively vote on whether to accept a
restructuring proposal. A portion of the international bonds were restructured through this mechanism,
but a significant proportion of the debt refused to participate, and these holdouts were paid in full. See
Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Christoph Trebesch & Mitu Gulati, The Greek Debt Restructuring: An Autopsy, 28
ECON. POL’Y 513 (2013).
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By submitting to foreign law and jurisdiction, sovereign borrowers
commit the legal version of “original sin,” in which a country issues debt
denominated in a foreign currency.18 Just as the promise to repay in foreign
currency protects against the fluctuating value of the borrower’s currency,
the submission to foreign law and jurisdiction protects against instability in
the borrower’s legal regime. But international debt also creates a tension.
Debt limits and other borrowing constraints serve important policy
objectives.19 They cannot serve these objectives if local officials can evade
them through the simple expedient of signing a loan contract that stipulates
to foreign law and jurisdiction.
The PDVSA 2020 bond dispute is a real-world example of the tension.
Another involves Ukraine. In 2013, that country issued a $3 billion bond
governed by English law, the entirety of which was purchased by the
Russian sovereign wealth fund. 20 Ukraine now seeks to avoid repayment
because (among other reasons) the loan put the country over the maximum
amount of external debt permitted by Ukrainian law. 21 The dispute has
made its way up to the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, which must
decide whether to enforce the loan. And there are other examples involving
both sovereign nations (e.g., Mozambique) and sub-sovereigns (e.g., Puerto
Rico).22
To what extent do such violations of the sovereign’s local law matter in
an international loan? As a theoretical matter, the question is a difficult one:
Should the sovereign’s agents be able to evade borrowing constraints so
easily? But this theoretical question presumes the answer to a more
foundational one: Do international loans in fact protect against the risk that a loan
will turn out to be in violation of the sovereign’s local law? This turns out to be a
complicated question. Both the Ukraine and Venezuela cases reveal
confusion about whether, in an international loan, the designated law in fact
governs disputes concerning the validity and enforceability of the loan.23
18. Barry Eichengreen, Ricardo Hausmann & Ugo Panizza, The Pain of Original Sin, in OTHER
PEOPLE’S MONEY, DEBT DENOMINATION AND FINANCIAL INSTABILITY IN EMERGING MARKET
ECONOMIES (Barry Eichengreen & Ricardo Hausmann eds., 2005).
19. See infra Part II.B.
20. W. Mark. C. Weidemaier, Contract Law and Ukraine’s $3 billion Debt to Russia, 11 CAP. MKTS.
L.J. 244 (2016); Ian Talley, What’s $3 Billion Between Enemies? Ukraine and Russia Battle Over Debt
Terminology, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 28, 2015), https://tinyurl.com/3dm4pjrt.
21. For a summary of these arguments, see Law Debenture Trust Corp. v. Ukraine [2017] EWHC
(Comm) 655 [23]-[33].
22. See Mary Williams Walsh, Puerto Rico Seeks to Have $9 Billion in Debt Declared Unconstitutional,
N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2019), https://tinyurl.com/y27hbjuk; Borges Nhamire & Matthew Hill,
Mozambique Wants to Void $622 Million Credit Suisse Loan, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 1, 2019),
https://tinyurl.com/pvykn5jf; Steven Bodzin, Bolivia Issuance Plan Could Lead to Legitimacy Fight, REDD
INTELLIGENCE (July 2, 2020) (on file with authors) (noting all of these cases).
23. See also Law Debenture Trust Corp. v. Ukraine [2017] EWHC (Comm) 655 [58] (“Ukraine
does not plead any English conflict of law principle that requires application of Ukrainian law to
determine Ukraine’s capacity to enter into the agreements, or otherwise explain the relevance of
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The answer to that question depends mostly on the text of the choice-oflaw clause in the loan. But the text will not always provide clear guidance.
As experts have long warned, choice-of-law clauses can leave much to
interpretation, and minor textual variations can produce different
outcomes.24
At least anecdotally, there is evidence that international sovereign bonds
do not include standardized governing law clauses. Consider the differences
in the governing law clauses applicable to the bonds issued by Ukraine and
PDVSA:



Ukraine: This Trust Deed and any non-contractual obligations
arising out of or in connection with it are governed by English
law.25
PDVSA: THIS INDENTURE AND THE NOTES SHALL
BE CONSTRUED IN ACCORDANCE WITH, AND THIS
INDENTURE AND THE NOTES AND ALL MATTERS
ARISING OUT OF OR RELATING IN ANY WAY
WHATSOEVER TO THIS INDENTURE AND THE
NOTES (WHETHER IN CONTRACT, TORT OR
OTHERWISE) SHALL BE GOVERNED BY, THE LAWS
OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK WITHOUT REGARD
TO THE CONFLICTS OF LAW PROVISIONS THEREOF
(OTHER THAN SECTION 5-1401 OF THE NEW YORK
GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW).26

Leaving aside the fact that one specifies English and the other New
York law, the clauses differ in ways that might prove important. Most
notably, Ukraine’s clause is relatively generic. For example, it does not
clearly indicate whether English law governs disputes over the validity or
enforceability of the loan. Nor does it indicate whether, by designating English
law, the intent was to exclude the application of English conflicts of law
rules. By contrast, PDVSA’s clause includes broad language designating
New York as the governing law for “all matters arising out of or relating in
Ukrainian law to an English law governed agreement.”). Compare Memorandum of Law in Support of
Defendants and Counterclaim Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 23-26, Petróleos de Venez.
S.A. v. MUFG Union Bank, No. 19 Civ. 10023, 2020 WL 6135761 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2020) (arguing
that New York law governs the validity of the collateral pledge), with Memorandum of Law in Support
of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Petróleos de Venez. S.A. v. MUFG Union Bank at 2327, No. 19 Civ. 10023, 2020 WL 6135761 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2020) (arguing that the question is
governed by Venezuelan law notwithstanding the designation of New York Law in the contract).
24. See John F. Coyle, The Canons of Construction for Choice-of-Law Clauses, 92 WASH. L. REV. 631,
643-47 (2017); Glenn West, Making Sure Your “Choice-of-Law” Clause Chooses All of the Law of the Chosen
Jurisdiction, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Sept. 18, 2017), https://tinyurl.com/m2r9x69k.
25. Trust Deed Relating to U.S. $1,250,000,000 7.50 Per Cent Notes due 2023 ¶ 25.1.
26. Indenture for Petróleos De Venezuela, S.A. 8.50% Senior Secured Notes Due 2020 § 10.03.
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any way to this indenture” and also expressly excludes the application of
New York’s conflicts of law rules.
These textual differences need not produce different interpretations.27
Sometimes, contract verbiage is simply encrustation, an overlay of legal
jargon that accumulates as lawyers tinker with a contract template. 28 But
some textual differences change meaning. That fact motivates our inquiry
here. To understand the relationship between international loans and locallaw borrowing constraints, one needs information about how international
sovereign bonds designate foreign law—that is, information about what
choice-of-law clauses actually say—and a sense of how courts will interpret
these provisions. At present, there is no good information about either
subject. This article attempts to correct the deficit.
Part II explains the contracting dynamics in this setting. In a lawsuit, the
governing law will be selected by applying the forum’s conflict of laws rules,
which will typically but not always honor the parties’ choice of law.29 Yet
even when the choice-of-law clause designates foreign law, courts
sometimes look to the sovereign’s local law. Courts often look to that law
to decide whether the parties in fact formed an enforceable choice-of-law
agreement. More broadly, courts look to the sovereign’s law to decide whether
a loan was validly issued but look to the designated foreign law to determine
the consequences of a violation. Yet there is a great deal of uncertainty, and
both investors and sovereign borrowers should value clarity in this context.
Part II describes this dynamic and explains why some sovereigns might
bargain to have their local law govern a relatively wide set of issues. The
short explanation is that this is the only way to ensure that local-law
borrowing constraints serve their important objectives.
Part III presents the results of a survey of international bonds issued by
a representative sample of sovereign borrowers, supplemented by a similar
data from bonds issued by state-owned firms and other sub-sovereigns. We
identify several common “carve-outs”—i.e., provisions explicitly reserving
a subset of issues for resolution under the sovereign’s local law. For example,
bonds frequently carve out questions of “authorization” and “execution”
from the choice-of-law clause. As an example, consider this clause from a
bond issued by Brazil in 2017 (emphasis ours):

27. With regard to Ukraine’s trust deed, for example, Ukraine argued that “questions of its
capacity and powers are, under the principles of English conflict of laws, governed by Ukrainian law.”
Ukraine v. Law Debenture Trust Corp. [2018] EWCA (Civ) 2026 [38]. The Court of Appeal did not
agree. For PDVSA’s trust deed, even without the express exclusion of New York conflicts rules, a
court would likely interpret the clause to incorporate only New York’s local law. See Coyle, supra note
24, at 643-47.
28. Choi et al., supra note 9; John F. Coyle & Mark C. Weidemaier, Interpreting Contracts Without
Context, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1673 (2018).
29. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF L. § 187 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
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The indenture and the debt securities will be governed by, and
interpreted in accordance with, the laws of the State of New York
without regard to those principles of conflicts of laws that would
require the application of the laws of a jurisdiction other than the
State of New York . . .; provided, further, that the laws of Brazil
will govern all matters governing authorization and execution
of the indenture and the debt securities by Brazil.30
Language like this might prove important in a dispute over the validity of a
loan issued in violation of the sovereign’s domestic law—at least if the
violation was understood to implicate a matter of “authorization” or
“execution.” Likewise, the absence of such a carve-out might suggest that
the issuer was content to have foreign law govern these questions. Indeed,
the indenture trustee makes precisely this argument in seeking to enforce
the collateral pledge in the PDVSA 2020 bonds, which do not include the
authorization and execution carve-out.31 Puzzlingly, we show that language
of this sort appears almost exclusively in bonds governed by New York law.
Part III also documents the use of an unusual, open-ended carve-out
applying local law to an unspecified set of “other matters.” Once again, this
carve-out appears only in bonds governed by New York law. For example,
this clause, used over the last decade and a half by Turkey, includes both the
carve-out for matters of authorization and execution and an additional
carve-out (in bold; emphasis ours) for “any other matters required to be
governed by the laws of Turkey.”
[The] securities will be governed by and interpreted in accordance
with the laws of the State of New York, except with respect to the
authorization and execution of the debt securities on behalf of Turkey and any
other matters required to be governed by the laws of Turkey,
which will be governed by the laws of Turkey.32
Part IV tries to make sense of these contracting practices. If the goal is
to provide clarity, these clauses fall short. The carve-out for matters of
“authorization” and “execution” is ambiguous, but it is at least possible that
it would change the result in disputes like those over the Ukrainian and
PDVSA bonds. If so, the carve-out would give real teeth to local-law
constraints on borrowing. Yet this may not have been the intended result.
The disclosure documents accompanying these loans do not inform
investors of any additional risk associated with the loan. Nor, in numerous
30. Prospectus, Federative Rep. of Brazil U.S. $10,000,000,000 Debt Securities (Dec. 28, 2017).
31. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants and Counterclaim Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Summary Judgment, Petróleos de Venez. S.A. v. MUFG Union Bank at 10-11, No. 19 Civ. 10023, 2020
WL 6135761 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2020).
32. Prospectus Supplement to Prospectus dated February 18, 2004, Republic of Turk., U.S.
$750,000,000 (June 24, 2004).
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conversations, have experienced sovereign debt lawyers been able to explain
the meaning of these carve-outs with any confidence.33
If the authorization and execution carve-out is a puzzle, the “other
matters” carve-out is confounding. This proviso leaves open the possibility
that additional, unspecified matters might be governed by the sovereign’s
local law. Indeed, it implies that the sovereign’s own law (rather than, say,
the conflicts rules of the forum) might define the range of issues falling
within the “other matters” exception. If so, the clause creates substantial
risk for investors, for it potentially allows the government to create new
exceptions to the governing law clause. Again, the disclosures accompanying
the bonds do not flag this risk.
It may be that most transactional lawyers gloss over the language of the
choice-of-law clause.34 Yet these textual variations can prove vital, as we are
seeing in the ongoing PDVSA litigation in New York. Part V concludes by
exploring some implications of our findings, including for the dispute over
the PDVSA 2020 bonds.

II.

CONTRACTING DYNAMICS AND GOVERNING LAW

To frame our empirical inquiry, we first describe the contracting
dynamics in play when a sovereign, in conjunction with its underwriters and
their respective lawyers, negotiates the terms of an international sovereign
bond.35 Three points emerge from this discussion.
First, although the choice-of-law clause in an international loan aims to
insulate investors from risks lurking in the sovereign’s local law, it is an
imperfect tool. Among other reasons, the fact that a contract calls for the
application of foreign law does not necessarily mean that a tribunal will in
fact apply the designated law when presented with a dispute over the
contract’s existence or validity (as opposed to disputes over interpretation,
remedies, etc.). 36 This tendency to apply local law to such questions,
33. We spoke to twenty senior sovereign debt lawyers in London and New York about our project.
We promised them anonymity as a condition of our research involving human subjects in accordance
with Duke Human Subjects Protocol 1192.
34. See John F. Coyle, Choice of Law Clauses in U.S. Bond Indentures, 13 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 152, 165
(2018) (“Since both the issuers and the underwriters generally view the ancillary language in the choiceof-law clause as unimportant, this language is virtually never discussed or negotiated.”).
35. Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, Public Symbol in Private Contract: A Case Study, 84 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1627, 1636-37 (2006) (describing the key contracts underlying a sovereign bond as “a product of
issuer-manager negotiations with their respective lawyers”).
36. For articulations of this view by leading commentators, see Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of
Law in the American Courts in 2001, 50 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 1, 21 (2002) (identifying “existence, validity,
scope, and enforceability” as “the four sequential logical steps that a court takes before applying the
law chosen by the clause”); Michael Gruson, Governing-Law Clauses in International and Interstate Loan
Agreements—New York’s Approach, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 207, 223 (giving as an example the need to
consult the law of a bond issuer’s state of incorporation even when the trust indenture designates New
York as the governing law); John F. Coyle & Christopher R. Drahozal, An Empirical Study of Dispute
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combined with the inherent unpredictability of conflict of laws doctrine,
puts a premium on careful drafting.
Second, from the perspective of the sovereign borrower, domestic
borrowing constraints serve important governance objectives. If a loan
contract’s designation of foreign law will undermine these objectives, many
sovereigns may hesitate to agree. One solution would be to carve out a set
of important matters from the scope of the choice-of-law clause. As noted,
some tribunals effectively establish such a carve-out by default, by looking
to the sovereign’s local law to resolve disputes over validity. But a carefully
drafted carve-out could remove any uncertainty.
Finally, the optimal balance of these considerations may vary from bond
issuance to bond issuance. For example, sovereigns that attach value to
honoring domestic borrowing constraints will seek to apply their own law
to questions affecting the enforceability of the loan. Although investors may
resist such demands for fear that the sovereign will manipulate its law to
expropriate value, they may compromise if the sovereign has a reputation
for respecting property rights and maintaining the stability of its legal system.
If so, we should expect variation across the governing law clauses used by
different sovereigns. That expectation motivates our examination of
sovereign bond contracts, discussed in Part III.

A. The Benefit (and Limits) of Designating Foreign Law
In a stylized sovereign bond issuance, both investors and sovereigns
want ex ante certainty about the legal rules that will govern the loan.
Uncertainty complicates the assessment of legal risk and may cause investors
to demand a premium.37 A choice-of-law clause can reduce uncertainty.38
Without such a clause, the governing law cannot be determined until a legal
dispute occurs, at which point the tribunal will identify the governing law by

Resolution Clauses in International Supply Contracts, 52 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 323, 341 (2019) (“[I]t is
unclear whether the parties may choose the law that will determine questions of a contract’s validity—
most courts have held that this question will always be determined by forum law.”).
37. See, e.g., Frank J. Fabozzi & George P. Kegler, Federal Agency Securities, in FINANCIAL MARKETS
& INSTRUMENTS 243, 248 (Frank J. Fabozzi ed., 2008); Mark Hallerberg & Guntram B. Wolff, Fiscal
Institutions, Fiscal Policy and Sovereign Risk Premia in EMU, 136 PUB. CHOICE 379, 382-83 (2008); cf.
Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47,
69 (1977) (noting that the risk that income tax changes might be repealed might cause taxpayers to
expect an uncertainty premium); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Altruism and Intermediation in the Market for Babies,
66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 203, 250 (2009) (“[L]egal uncertainty regarding the enforceability of surrogacy
contracts . . . causes those that remain in the surrogacy sector to charge a risk premium.”).
38. Although in practice, many question whether contracting parties know very much about the
law they select. LEA BRILMAYER ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES AND MATERIALS 698 (7th ed.
2015); see also Coyle, supra note 24, at 633 (noting that a party that has written a choice-of-law clause
into its agreement will “rarely” have “conducted extensive research into the law of the chosen
jurisdiction.”).
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applying the conflict of laws rules applicable in that forum. 39 These rules do
not always yield clear answers. 40 Moreover, conflicts rules differ across
jurisdictions. International sovereign bonds rarely provide for exclusive
jurisdiction in any forum, meaning courts in multiple countries as well as
arbitration tribunals may hear disputes under the same loan contract. 41 Thus,
without a choice-of-law clause, the rules of the game will not become clear
until long after the contract is executed. Of course, a choice-of-law clause
need not designate foreign law. But the point of an international loan is to
protect investors against the risk that the sovereign will change the rules of
the game after the loan is made.42
When the contract includes a choice-of-law clause, tribunals usually
respect the parties’ choice and apply the law designated in the contract.
However, when a sovereign challenges a loan contracted in violation of its
local law, the outcome is less clear. Before applying the law designated in
the contract, the tribunal must resolve disputes over the existence, validity,
and scope of the choice-of-law clause.43 It will apply the forum’s conflicts
rules to identify the law governing such disputes, and these rules will often
point to the sovereign’s local law.44 Moreover, courts have typically found
the sovereign’s local law applicable in resolving a range of questions related
to the formation and validity of the contract itself. Thus, the sovereign’s

39. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 59 (1995) (describing a choice
of law clause as “a substitute for the conflict-of-laws analysis.”).
40. For example, in the approach taken by U.S. jurisdictions that follow the Restatement (Second)
of Conflict of Laws, the governing law is generally that of the state with “the most significant
relationship to the transaction and the parties.” See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
L., § 188 (AM. L. INST. 1971). In the absence of an effective choice-of-law clause, this rule also
determines which law will govern disputes over the loan’s validity, including disputes over whether the
borrower had capacity to incur the loan, whether its agents were authorized to act on its behalf, and
whether the loan was properly executed. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF L. § 198,
292, 301, 302 (AM. L. INST. 1971). The generality of the rule leaves courts with significant discretion in
selecting the governing law. For general criticism of the incoherence of conflicts doctrine, see, e.g.,
Kermit Roosevelt III, The Myth of Choice of Law: Rethinking Conflicts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2448 (1999);
Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of
Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249 (1992); Shirley A. Wiegand, Fifty Conflict of Laws ‘Restatements’: Merging
Judicial Discretion and Legislative Endorsement, 65 LA. L. REV. 1 (2005). For an argument that conflict of
laws analysis may be more predictable in the international context, see Christopher A. Whytock, Myth
or Mess? International Choice of Law in Action, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 719 (2009).
41. W. Mark C. Weidemaier & Mitu Gulati, International Finance and Sovereign Debt, in PUBLIC LAW
AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS ¶ 23.3 (Francesco Parisi ed., 2017).
42. See, e.g., Marcos Chamon et al., Foreign-Law Bonds: Can They Reduce Sovereign Borrowing Costs?, 114
J. INT’L ECON. 164 (2018) (finding that foreign-law bonds issued by euro area governments carried
lower yields during periods of financial distress).
43. See Symeonides, supra note 36, at 21; see also infra note 50 (discussing New York law regarding
the enforceability of a choice-of-law clause that designates New York law).
44. Courts also apply the procedural law of the forum, rather than the procedural law of the
designated jurisdiction.
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local law will usually define the requirements for a properly-issued loan, the
actual authority of purported agents, and the legality of the loan’s issuance.45
It is important to bear in mind the limited nature of these questions. A
purported agent who lacks actual authority may nevertheless have apparent
authority (although some jurisdictions may not permit lawsuits against
foreign states based on a theory of apparent authority).46 Likewise, the fact
that a contract violated the sovereign’s local law does not mean that it cannot
be enforced. 47 And on these questions—on questions of enforceability—
courts typically look to the law designated in the contract.48 As one federal
court in New York put it:
In cases alleging a violation of foreign law, the existence of illegality
is to be determined by the local law of the jurisdiction where the
illegal act is done, while the effect of illegality upon the contractual
relationship is to be determined by the law of the jurisdiction which
is selected under conflicts analysis.49
When the contract includes a choice-of-law clause, conflicts analysis will
almost inevitably result in the application of the designated law.50 Thus, in
45. See infra notes 54-54; see also Exp. Imp. Bank of China v. Cent. Bank of Liber., No. 15-CV09565 (ALC), 2017 WL 1378271 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2017), vacated at request of parties, Exp.-Imp. Bank
of China v. Cent. Bank of Liber., No. 15-CV-09565 (ALC), 2018 WL 1871436 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2018)
(“Where a commercial transaction is with a foreign state and that state has the most significant
relationship to the transaction, New York law turns to the law of the foreign state in order to determine
actual authority of the agent to enter into a contract.”).
46. In the United States, the law on this question is unclear. Compare First Fid. Bank, N.A. v.
Gov’t of Ant. & Barb., 877 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1989) (recognizing jurisdiction based on apparent
authority), with Phaneuf v. Republic of Indon., 106 F.3d 302 (9th Cir. 1997) (ruling that the commercial
activity exception to sovereign immunity requires a showing of actual authority).
47. Technically, the relevant jurisdiction is the one where the allegedly illegal act occurred,
although in our context this will typically point to the sovereign’s local law.
48. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF L. § 202 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 1971) (“A
distinction must here be drawn between the effect of illegality upon the validity of the contract and the
existence of illegality as such.”).
49. Korea Life Ins. Co. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 269 F. Supp. 2d 424, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
50. In some circumstances, courts may refuse to give effect to a choice-of-law clause. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF L. § 187(2) (AM. L. INST. 1971); Commission Regulation
593/2008, 2008 O.J. (L 177) 10, art. 3(3), 3(4). Conflicts law in the United States generally lets a court
override the parties’ choice of law when that choice offends a mandatory rule of law representing a
fundamental policy of another state with a materially greater interest. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF L. § 187(2) (AM. L. INST. 1971). In New York, General Obligations Law § 5-1401, which
applies to business contracts involving $250,000 or more where the parties choose New York law, has
been interpreted to eliminate this “fundamental policy” exception. See Supply & Bldg. Co. v. Estee
Lauder Int’l, Inc., 2000 WL 223838 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2000). Virtually all sovereign loans involve
amounts greater than $250,000. However, some courts have added a qualification: a contract illegal in
its place of performance will not be enforced if the intent of the contract was to violate the law. See
Lehman Bros. Com. Corp. v. Minmetals Int’l Non-Ferrous Metals Trading Co., 179 F. Supp. 2d 118
(S.D.N.Y. 2000); see also Commercial Contracts: Strategies for Drafting and Negotiating § 6.05[C]
(Vladimir R. Rossman & Morton Moskin eds., Wolters Kluwer 2019). Although § 5-1401 does not
explicitly dispense with the “fundamental policy” exception, some U.S. states have statutes that do so.
See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1G-3.
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the Korea Life case quoted just above, Korean insurance law determined
whether a contract between a Korean insurer and a New York bank
constituted an illegal guaranty.51 But New York law determined whether the
contract’s violation of Korean law rendered the contract unenforceable. It
did not.52
A similar distinction is sometimes drawn between questions of actual
and apparent authority. For instance, in litigation over the enforceability of
Ukraine’s $3 billion bond issuance, the parties agreed that Ukrainian law
determined whether government officials had actual authority to approve
the loan, but the Court of Appeal applied English law, designated by the
indenture, to evaluate whether officials had ostensible (i.e., apparent)
authority to bind the sovereign.53 Likewise, in the context of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, U.S. courts generally look to the sovereign’s local
law to determine the scope of an official’s actual authority but to the law
designated in the contract to determine whether the official had apparent
authority to bind the sovereign.54
Nevertheless, parties sometimes argue that an international sovereign
bond requires the application of foreign law to all such questions. This
appears to be how the trustee for the PDVSA 2020 bonds understands New
York law.55 The argument draws on recent New York cases, most notably
IRB-Brasil Resseguros v. Inepar Investments.56 There, a Brazilian company that
had guaranteed notes issued under New York law argued that the guarantee
was void under Brazilian law because the company’s board had not
authorized it. The company argued that the contract’s designation of New
York law included the state’s conflicts rules, which pointed to the law of
Brazil, the company argued, to resolve disputes over the validity of the
guarantee. The New York Court of Appeals disagreed, ruling that the
51. Korea Life, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 437-38.
52. Id. at 442.
53. Law Debenture Trust Corp. v. Ukr. [2017] EWHC (Comm) 655 [136]; Ukr. v. Law Debenture
Trust Corp. [2018] EWCA (Civ) 2026 [76]-[78]; see also Indosuez Int’l Fin. B.V. v. Nat’l Reserve Bank,
774 N.E.2d 696 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2002) (applying New York law on question of apparent authority).
Even when conflicts rules do not directly select the sovereign’s local law on questions of actual
authority, courts may reach that result indirectly. See, e.g., Northrup Grumman Ship Sys. v. Ministry of
Def. of Republic of Venez., 575 F.3d 491, 497 (5th Cir. 2009) (ruling that Mississippi law governed
questions of actual authority but included an exception in which a foreign sovereign’s law determined
the actual authority of its purported agents).
54. See, e.g., Themis Capital v. Dem. Rep. Congo, 881 F. Supp. 2d 508, 520-21 (S.D.N.Y. 2012);
Phaneuf v. Republic of Indonesia, 106 F.3d 302 (9th Cir. 1997); Packsys, S.A. v. Exportadora de Sal,
899 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2018); Morgan Guar. Trust v. Republic of Palau, 657 F. Supp. 1475 (S.D.N.Y.
1987).
55. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants and Counterclaim Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Summary Judgment at 24-25, Petróleos de Venez. v. MUFG Union Bank, No. 19 Civ. 10023 (KPF)
(S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2020) (noting only a potential exception for cases where the choice of law clause
itself was the product of fraud).
56. 982 N.E.2d 609 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2012).
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choice-of-law clause incorporated only the local law of New York. 57
Although that general proposition is uncontroversial, 58 both the outcome
and the Court of Appeals’ unqualified language arguably imply that all
disputes are to be resolved in accordance with the law designated in the
contract. As the Court of Appeals put it in a subsequent case, “when parties
include a choice-of-law provision in a contract, they intend that the law of
the chosen state—and no other state—will be applied.” 59
Yet it is not clear that cases like IRB-Brasil signal a material departure
from past practice, even in New York. 60 New York law is often
characterized as more willing to respect the contracting parties’ chosen law
than competing jurisdictions,61 but does not strike us as materially different
in this respect from English law (or, indeed, the law of many other
jurisdictions).62 To be fair, it is usually through the application of forum
conflicts rules that a tribunal will select the sovereign’s local law to govern
an issue. IRB-Brasil holds that a choice-of-law clause incorporating New
York law presumptively excludes these rules. 63 But the context for that
holding was quite specific. The transaction in IRB-Brasil involved two
contracts, a fiscal agency agreement and a guarantee. Each included a choice
of law clause selecting New York law, but only the fiscal agency agreement
expressly disclaimed the intent to incorporate New York’s conflicts rules.64
The guarantor argued that the omission of this disclaimer from the
guarantee meant that the parties intended for those rules to apply. The Court
of Appeals quite sensibly rejected this argument. It has long been the rule in
New York and elsewhere that a choice of law clause incorporates only the

57. Id. at 612.
58. For instance, the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws understands a choice-of-law
clause to refer only to the designated state’s local law. Parties who wish to incorporate the designated
jurisdiction’s conflicts rules (which might point to the law of another state) must do so expressly.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF L. § 187(3) (AM. L. INST. 1971).
59. Ministers & Missionaries Benefit Bd. v. Snow, 45 N.E.3d 917, 924 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2015).
60. Indeed, the unqualified language of cases like Ministers & Missionaries is hard to square with
other aspects of New York’s conflicts law, such as the presumption that a generic choice of law clause
does not apply to non-contractual claims. See Coyle, supra note 24, at 667-68.
61. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller & Theodore Eisenberg, The Market for Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2073, 2087-89 (2009); Larry E. Ribstein & Erin Ann O’Hara, Corporations and the Market for Law,
2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 661, 679-80.
62. For example, the Rome I regulation generally treats a contractual choice of law as conclusive,
see Regulation 593/2008, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the Law
Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome I), 2008 O.J. (L 177) at art. 3(1), with limited exceptions
to protect mandatory rules of member states or the European Community, see id. art. 3(2), 3(3). The
United Kingdom may take an even dimmer view of allowing a mandatory provision of foreign law to
override the parties’ chosen law, although the parties’ choice does not receive absolute deference. See
JAN-JAAP KUIPERS, EU LAW AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE INTERRELATIONSHIP IN
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS 168 (2012).
63. IRB-Brasil, 982 N.E.2d at 612.
64. Id. at 610.
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local (or “internal”) law of the designated state. 65 This is an interpretive
rule—the canon in favor of internal law—that “is followed by U.S. courts
almost without exception.”66 In Europe, it is expressly incorporated into the
Rome I Regulation.67
But to presume that a choice-of-law clause excludes the conflicts rules
of the designated jurisdiction is not to say that the designated law governs
all issues. It would be non-sensical, for instance, to apply the designated law
without first determining that the parties in fact agreed to the choice-of-law
clause. Thus, forum conflicts rules determine which law governs disputes
over contract formation.68 Nothing about IRB-Brasil purports to change this
sensible rule. Indeed, it is not even clear that IRB-Brasil means to reject the
distinction, drawn in cases like Korea Life, between the legality of a contract
and the consequences of illegality.69 That distinction has long been thought
compatible with the canon in favor of internal law.70 In fact, it would make
little sense to apply foreign law to determine the legality of an international
sovereign bond, the formalities required for its issuance, or the actual
authority of government agents. The designated foreign law will not have
anything to say on such matters. For instance, neither English nor New
York law will help identify which official or institution, within the potentially
vast bureaucratic apparatus of some foreign state, must execute loan
documents on the state’s behalf.71 Thus, it is widely accepted that, despite a
choice-of-law clause designating foreign law, the “legal status and capacity
of the borrower, including his contracting and borrowing limits can . . . be
determined only by national [i.e., local] law.”72 Experienced practitioners in
sovereign debt markets generally concede the point. 73 This result is also
65. See, e.g., Reger v. Nat’l Ass’n. of Bedding Mfrs., 372 N.Y.S.2d 97, 118 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975)
(choice of law clause designating Illinois law); Weiss v. La Suisse, Societé d’Assurances sur la Vie, 293
F. Supp. 2d 397, 402 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
66. Coyle, supra note 24, at 646.
67. See Council Regulation 593/2008, 2008 O.J. (L 177), supra note 62, art. 20.
68. Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2012). Technically, forum conflicts
rules determine the law applicable to disputes over formation of the choice-of-law clause, although typically
the dispute will implicate the entire contract.
69. Korea Life Ins. Co. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 269 F. Supp. 2d 424, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF L. § 202 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 1971) (noting
importance of distinguishing the fact of illegality from the consequences of illegality).
71. Cf. Joseph W. Dellapenna, Suing Foreign Governments and Their Corporations: Sovereign Immunity, 85
COM. L.J. 486, 487-88 (1981) (noting, in the context of the act of state doctrine, that “who is better
suited to determine whether the action is legal than the highest legal authority of the state (often, of
course, the very officials whose conduct is in question)?”).
72. Thomas Wälde, The Sanctity of Debt and Insolvent Countries: Defenses of Debtors in International Loan
Agreements, in JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DEBT OBLIGATIONS 125 (David M.
Sassoon & Daniel D. Bradlow eds., 1987).
73. “A contractual choice of law clause in a loan agreement does not mean that the stipulated law
will govern every aspect of the transaction. For example, the corporate authority of a party to enter
into the agreement or the due execution of the contract by a party are matters that will probably be
determined under the law of the place where the party is domiciled, not under the chosen governing
law of the contract.” LEE C. BUCHHEIT, HOW TO NEGOTIATE EUROCURRENCY LOAN
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consistent with corporate law’s internal affairs doctrine, under which the law
of the place of incorporation typically governs matters concerning relations
among the corporation and its officers, directors, shareholders, and agents.74
These rules do not necessarily help a sovereign borrower like Venezuela—
a subject we address in Part V. But they are sensible enough that we hesitate
to assume that IRB-Brasil meant to discard them.
Whatever the meaning of cases like IRB-Brasil, the rules discussed in this
section may be problematic in an international sovereign loan. Recall that
both sovereign issuers and investors have reason to favor ex ante clarity
about the rules that will govern the loan.75 The law described in this section
is far from a model of clarity, and this creates uncertainty about how courts
will resolve a sovereign’s challenge to the enforceability of a loan issued in
violation of its local law. For example, in the dispute over the collateralized
PDVSA 2020 bond, the indenture trustee has argued that New York law
governs all issues, and that Venezuelan law requiring legislative approval of
contracts in the “national public interest” is simply irrelevant.76 PDVSA, by
contrast, argues that Venezuelan law determines not just whether the loan
and collateral pledge required legislative approval but the validity of the
contract in the absence of approval.77 Both sides overstate the law in favor
of their clients.
With the caveat that the law is far from clear, we think the law is
somewhere in between the positions of the lawyers in the PDVSA litigation,
although it generally favors investors by allowing the contract’s designated
law to determine the consequences of any violation of the sovereign’s local
law. Nevertheless, the wording of the clauses gives the parties room to argue
for the application of different law to these questions. This is an unavoidable
consequence of the lack of bright line rules for resolving conflict of laws
AGREEMENTS 129 (Rob Mannix ed., 2d ed. 2004); see also J. G. Collier, CONFLICT OF LAWS 208 (3d
ed. 2001).
74 . Commercial Contracts: Strategies for Drafting and Negotiating § 6.03[C] (Vladimir R.
Rossman & Morton Moskin eds., Wolters Kluwer 2019) (noting that the law of the place of
incorporation governs matters such as “whether or not the appropriate corporate actions have been
taken to authorize an agreement and whether the persons who signed the agreement in the name and
on behalf of a corporation or other entity . . . were properly elected or appointed officers, authorized
to act on behalf of the corporation or other entity and to bind the corporation or other entity by their
action”).
75. See supra pp. 10-11.
76. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants and Counterclaim Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Summary Judgment at 25, Petróleos de Venez. v. MUFG Union Bank, No. 19 Civ. 10023 (KPF)
(S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2020) (“Section 5-1401 precludes the PDVSA Parties’ reliance on alleged
requirements of Venezuelan law to escape their agreement that the Governing Documents are subject
to the law of New York.”).
77. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 24, Petróleos
de Venez. v. MUFG Union Bank, No. 19 Civ. 10023 (KPF) (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2020) (“The
Transaction Documents’ New York choice-of-law provisions are irrelevant in determining whether the
2020 Notes Transaction is valid in the first place.”).
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problems. More pragmatically, it is a consequence of the fact that sovereign
debt disputes involve so-called “big conflicts,” in which deep-seated policies
of multiple states come into conflict. 78 In the context of sovereign debt
disputes, the conflict is between New York and London, which have firmlyentrenched policies in favor of enforcing contracts, and the foreign state,
for which constraints on borrowing seek to promote important governance
objectives. We next explore the nature of these governance objectives and
their potential implications for the terms of sovereign loan contracts.

B. Why Constrain Borrowing? A Word on Inter-generational Conflict and Agency
Costs
Thus far, we have seen that conflict of laws rules generally look to the
sovereign’s local law to decide whether a loan was validly issued but to the
law designated in the contract to define the consequences of any violation.
Though somewhat unclear in application, this rule generally favors investors
by allowing courts to enforce even those loans that concededly violate the
sovereign’s law. This result is also consistent with the general intent of an
international loan to protect investors from legal risks lurking in the
sovereign’s law. From the perspective of a sovereign borrower, however, it
is problematic. It is one thing to give up the right to retroactively change the
law in ways that undermine investor rights. That is one way to describe the
restructuring methods employed by Greece in 2012 and Barbados in 201819, and it clearly describes the U.S. government’s abrogation of gold clauses
in its own debt in the 1930s.79 It is quite another to issue debt that is at that
very moment forbidden by the sovereign’s own law. If an international loan is
enforceable despite such a violation, the sovereign loses a key tool of
governance.
Debt limits (e.g. Ukraine), legislative approval requirements (e.g.,
PDVSA), and other borrowing constraints serve important objectives. In
broad terms, one might characterize debt limits as tools to mitigate the intergenerational tension inherent in government borrowing. 80 When a
community borrows, it monetizes the earning capacity of its future members
and uses the funds for present consumption or investment. Because
78. Katherine Florey, Big Conflicts Little Conflicts, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 683 (2015).
79. In the cases of Greece and Barbados, an argument can be made that the retroactive legal
changes benefitted creditors as a collective by preventing individual creditors from impeding a
restructuring. There is also evidence that markets reacted favorably to the abrogation of gold clauses
in U.S. corporate bonds. See Randall S. Kroszner, Is it Better to Forgive than to Receive? Repudiation of the
Gold Indexation Clause in Long-Term Debt Before the Great Depression (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 481, 1998).
80. Mayor & Recorder of Nashville v. Ray, 86 U.S. 468, 475 (1873) (“The power to borrow money
is different. When this is exercised the citizens are immediately affected only by the benefit arising from
the loan; its burden is not felt till afterwards.”).
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community membership changes over time, those who will repay the debt
may have had no say in the decision to incur it.81 Their lack of political
influence creates incentives for current members to fund spending needs
through debt.82 Borrowing caps do not eliminate these incentives but can
limit the extent of the imposition on future members.
Legislative approval and other process-based constraints mitigate
agency problems inherent in debt, in which public servants may have
incentives to borrow in ways that do not increase overall welfare.83 These
constraints take many forms, from the Venezuelan requirement of legislative
approval for loans in the “national public interest” to requirements that
voters approve the loan and a tax increase sufficient to fund debt service
(common in the U.S. municipal context).84 More broadly, both hard debt
limits and process-based constraints can be viewed as efforts to reduce
profligate borrowing—i.e., borrowing that does not benefit the people who
will be expected to repay.85
The importance of such borrowing constraints is evidenced by the fact
that they are commonplace at all levels of government in the United States.86
They are no less important when adopted by foreign sovereigns. And their
importance is undermined when courts apply foreign law to determine the
consequences of a violation. The sovereign’s local law will usually treat
borrowing constraints as mandatory rules, not defaults, for reasons that are
obvious. A constraint that local officials are empowered to waive cannot

81. Clayton P. Gillette, Direct Democracy and Debt, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 365, 391-92
(2004); Stewart E. Sterk & Elizabeth S. Goldman, Controlling Legislative Shortsightedness: The Effectiveness of
Constitutional Debt Limitations, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1301, 1301.
82. See, e.g., Richard C. Schragger, Citizens Versus Bondholders, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 787, 790
(2012).
83. Lars P. Feld & Gebhard Kirschgässner, The Political Economy of Direct Legislation: Direct Democracy
and Local Decision-Making, 16 ECON. POL. 329, 355 (2001).
84. See generally Citizen Participation in the American Federal System, ADVISORY COMM’N
INTERGOV’TAL REL. 254 (1979) (discussing the role of citizen participation in the municipal debt
authorization process).
85. Gillette, supra note 81, at 365-66; Christiana Ochoa, From Odious Debt to Odious Finance: Avoiding
the Externalities of a Functional Odious Debt Doctrine, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 109, 112-113 (2008); Lee C.
Buchheit, Mitu Gulati & Robert B. Thompson, The Dilemma of Odious Debts, 56 DUKE L.J. 1201, 120820 (2007).
86. The federal government operates under a statutory debt ceiling (currently suspended through
July 2021), which allows Congress substantial control over the federal budget. See Anita S.
Krishnakumar, In Defense of the Debt Limit Statute, 42 HARV. J. LEGIS. 135, 163 (2005). Beginning in the
late 19th century, debt limits, authorization requirements, and other constraints were increasingly
imposed on U.S. municipalities. See generally Stewart E. Sterk & Elizabeth S. Goldman, Controlling
Legislative Shortsightedness: The Effectiveness of Constitutional Debt Limitations, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1301, 1309;
Joan C. Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability of American Local Government: The Politics of City Status in
American Law, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 83, 93-94; Nadav Shoked, Debt Limits’ End, 102 IOWA L. REV. 123941 (2017). Some states operate under similar constraints, many stemming from the wave of defaults
and repudiations in the 1830s and 1840s. See, e.g., John J. Wallis, Constitutions, Corporations, and Corruption:
American States and Constitutional Change: 1842 to 1852, 65 J. ECON. HIST. 211, 217 (2005).
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meaningfully constrain their incentives to over-borrow. 87 When a court
applies foreign law to determine the consequences of a violation, and
subsequently enforces the loan, it effectively converts these mandatory rules
into defaults. 88 After all, a loan enforced under a theory of apparent
authority burdens future generations just as much as a loan enforced under
a theory of actual authority.

C. Drafting Hypotheses (and Difficulties)
The foregoing discussion implies a lack of standardization in the
governing law clauses in sovereign loans. For example, consider two stylized
sovereign borrowers seeking to raise money in capital markets in New York
or London. Both operate under borrowing constraints. The first, a rich
country, has a reputation for respecting property rights and a legal system
that is transparent and known to investors. It satisfies most of its borrowing
needs by issuing debt governed entirely by its own law but occasionally, as
in our example, issues debt governed by foreign law.89 Even when it issues
international debt, such a country might expect its local law to govern all
disputes over the enforceability of the loan. Investors might accept this debt
without demanding significantly higher yields. 90 By contrast, a poor country
with an unfamiliar legal system might face a significant yield penalty if it
insisted on such a clause. This would be especially likely if investors had
reason to doubt the sovereign’s long-term willingness or ability to pay. It is
not always easy to detect when a loan triggers a borrowing constraint in the
sovereign’s local law.91 In a financial crisis, a sovereign borrower may have
87. We oversimplify somewhat. For instance, restrictions on the form of a waiver—for example,
a rule requiring local officials to make a clear, public statement of the intent to waive any restrictions
imposed by local law—might somewhat constrain discretion by increasing the political accountability
of the official who approves the loan.
88. This possibility is commonplace in conflict of laws, which gives significant weight to party
autonomy and authorizes tribunals to apply the parties’ chosen law even when the outcome will violate
another state’s mandatory law. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF L. § 187(2) & cmt
d (AM. L. INST. 1971); Regulation 593/2008, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17
June 2008 on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome I), 2008 O.J. (L 177) at art. 3(3),
3(4). It is also a consequence enabled by other areas of law. For instance, at least in theory, parties can
avoid the effect of mandatory rules by agreeing to resolve disputes in arbitration. See Stephen J. Ware,
Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 711 (1999).
89. Among many reasons for this, a sovereign’s issuance of foreign-law debt can set a benchmark
yield curve to facilitate the issuance of foreign-law corporate debt. See, e.g., WORLD BANK &
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, DEVELOPING GOVERNMENT BOND MARKETS: A
HANDBOOK 3 (2001) (making the point with regard to domestic debt).
90 . The available evidence, although limited, suggests that foreign-law bonds offer pricing
benefits during periods of financial crisis. See Chamon et al., supra note 42, at 178. Rich countries posing
little default risk derive few pricing benefits from foreign-law debt and would presumably incur no
serious penalty by carving out a wide range of issues for resolution under local law. See Bradley et al.,
supra note 9, at 290.
91. In U.S. federal courts, disputes over the content of foreign law often involve extensive
testimony and documentary evidence. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1. In the dispute over the PDVSA
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incentives to interpret its domestic borrowing constraints expansively in
hopes of invalidating some of its debt. Issuers with sterling reputations for
repayment may be able to persuade investors to take this risk. Issuers
without such reputations may have to submit to foreign law on the widest
possible range of issues.
This contracting dynamic might generate different approaches to
drafting the choice-of-law clause. For example, the parties might use a
generic clause stating only that the contract will be “governed by” the
designated law.92 As noted, with the generic clause, the sovereign’s local law
will probably determine whether the loan violates a borrowing constraint,
but the designated law will determine the consequences of any violation.
However, the generic clause leaves room for parties to argue—as in the
dispute over the PDVSA 2020 bonds—over the range of issues, if any,
governed by local law.
Alternatively, investors seeking greater certainty and reduced risk might
prefer language making clear that the designated law will cover the widest
possible range of issues, including those related to the validity and
enforceability of the loan. There are ready-made models of such language.
For instance, in the arbitration context, federal law in the United States
allows courts to resolve disputes over the enforceability of the agreement to
arbitrate, unless the agreement “clearly and unmistakably” sends such issues
to arbitration. 93 Many arbitration contracts, and some institutional
arbitration rules, include examples that could be adapted for this context.
As an example, the JAMS arbitration rules for employment disputes
expressly require the arbitrator to resolve disputes over the arbitration
agreement’s “formation, existence, [and] validity.”94 Similar language could
be used to express the parties’ intent to apply foreign law broadly, including
to disputes over the formation, existence, and validity of the loan. This
would not always guarantee the application of foreign law. As noted, courts
sometimes apply the borrower’s local law notwithstanding a choice-of-law
clause to the contrary, as when a question in a corporate loan implicates the
internal affairs doctrine. 95 But it would minimize risk to investors by
instructing tribunals to apply foreign law whenever the law permits.
2020 bonds, for instance, the parties have submitted hundreds of pages of exhibits contesting the need
for legislative approval of the loan. Cf. Korea Life Ins. Co. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 269 F. Supp.
2d 424, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting the judge’s hesitancy to “declare his opinion on such a difficult
and disputed point” as the validity of a guaranty under Korean insurance law).
92. Coyle, supra note 24, at 666.
93. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) (citation omitted).
94. See, e.g., JAMS Employment Arbitration Rules and Procedures, Rule 11(b) (July 1, 2014),
https://tinyurl.com/w6nea6np (providing that such issues “shall be submitted to and ruled on by the
Arbitrator.”).
95. Cf. Wälde, supra note 72, at 125 (“The legal status and capacity of the borrower, including his
contracting and borrowing limits can . . . be determined only by national law. These are matters of
‘non-choice.’”).
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Finally, sovereigns seeking to give teeth to their domestic borrowing
constraints might negotiate carve-outs—i.e., language clarifying that, despite
the general designation of foreign law, the sovereign’s local law will govern
disputes over the validity and enforceability of the contract. We will call this
approach the local-law carve-out. Any attempt to craft a local-law carve-out
will place a premium on careful drafting. Assume, for instance, that a
sovereign issuer wants to ensure that its own law will govern questions
concerning the validity of the loan, thereby ensuring that local law
borrowing constraints will serve their purpose. Two problems complicate
this objective.
First, any carve-out must identify which legal issues are reserved for
resolution under local law. But when a sovereign contests the enforceability
of a loan made in violation of its domestic law, it is not always clear how to
describe the legal issues raised by the challenge. Consider the argument that
the loan violates a constitutional or statutory debt limit. Does the debt limit
negate the sovereign’s capacity to borrow, limit the authority of government
officials to bind the sovereign, or make the loan illegal or contrary to policy?
By analogy to contract law, a sovereign that lacks capacity to enter a loan
contract can incur only voidable obligations with respect to that contract.96
It cannot form a binding contract to borrow and repay the money. 97
Capacity normally is understood as a characteristic of the party, not of the
contract. So understood, it would seem illogical to argue that a state lacks
capacity to incur debt when it is concededly able to form other types of
binding obligation. Despite this, constraints such as constitutional debt
limits are sometimes framed as limits on the capacity to borrow. 98
An alternative way to understand a borrowing constraint is as a
limitation on the authority of state actors. The state may have the capacity
to incur debt but, like any other fictitious legal entity, it can only act through
agents.99 Perhaps borrowing constraints define the circumstances in which
officials are empowered to bind the state to a loan contract. Or perhaps laws
constraining sovereign borrowing simply articulate a public policy against
the enforcement of particular contracts, much like laws forbidding the
enforcement of contracts that immunize a party for intentional torts.100 To
complicate matters further, different borrowing constraints may prompt
96. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 15 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
97. It is a separate question whether the sovereign must pay restitution as a condition of being
allowed to avoid the contract. See, e.g., Hayward v. City of Corpus Christi, 195 S.W.2d 995, 998 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1946); Olds v. Town of Belleair, 41 F. Supp. 453, 457 (S.D. Fla. 1941).
98. Ukr. v. Law Debenture Trust Corp. [2018] EWCA (Civ) 2026 [23]-[75] QB 1121 (Eng.); State
v. Spring City, 123 Utah 471, 473-74 (1953).
99. W. Mark C. Weidemaier & Mitu Gulati, The Relevance of Law to Sovereign Debt, 11 ANNUAL R.
L. & SOC. SCI. 395-408 (2015).
100. See, e.g., Strawbridge v. Sugar Mountain Resort, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 2d 425, 432-33 (W.D.N.C.
2004).
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different legal characterizations. As noted, in the U.S. municipal debt
context, courts often treat debt limits found in the state constitution as limits
on municipal capacity. 101 By contrast, courts treat voting and other
procedural requirements as conditions that must be satisfied for a loan to
be properly authorized.102
On the merits, the categorization may prove important. For example, a
borrower can later ratify an unauthorized loan; this is not possible if the
borrower lacks capacity.103 The distinction between a lack of capacity and a
lack of authority may also affect an investor’s right to restitution if the loan
is deemed invalid, as in the U.S. municipal finance context.104 But merits
aside, the categorization dilemma complicates the task of drafting an
appropriate carve-out from a foreign-law choice-of-law clause. An overlybroad clause exposes investors to unwanted risk. An unduly narrow clause
allows the loan to circumvent limits on the sovereign’s ability to borrow.
The categorization problem has caused confusion in practice. With
regard to Ukraine’s $3 billion bond, for instance, the country argued that the
loan exceeded borrowing limits set by the budget law in effect at the time
and also that the issuance failed to comply with procedural rules governing
approval by the Cabinet of Ministers. 105 Before the English courts, the
country argued that these defects meant that it lacked capacity to incur the
debt.106 But it also characterized the argument as challenging the authority
of the Minister of Finance to bind the country to the agreement. 107 The
indenture trustee, by contrast, insisted that these were matters affecting the
authority of the country’s representatives but not the capacity of the country
itself.108 Likewise, in the litigation over the PDVSA 2020 bonds, the parties
characterize the dispute, variously, as implicating questions of authority
(both actual and apparent) and capacity.109
101. See, e.g., Spring City, 123 Utah at 473-74.
102. See, e.g., Olds, 41 F. Supp. at 457.
103. Again, borrowing from contract and agency law, ratification is possible only when the
incapacity has been removed. See, e.g., Silver v. U.S., 498 F. Supp. 610, 612 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (principal
who lacked capacity at time agent entered contract may ratify contract after regaining competence).
104. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 33 cmt. e
(AM. L. INST. 2011) (discussing the distinction but attributing it to the fact that ultra vires loans more
likely yield no benefit to the municipality and its taxpayers).
105. Ukr. v. Law Debenture Trust Corp. [2018] EWCA (Civ) 2026 [35], [42], [40]-[70] QB 1121
(Eng.).
106. Id. [37].
107. Id. [70.1].
108. The dispute over characterization had significant implications even though the bond
included a choice of law clause selecting English law. The parties agreed that, if characterized as a
question of actual authority, then Ukrainian law would govern. By contrast, the Court of Appeal applied
English law to resolve disputes over questions of capacity and apparent authority. Id. [37], [71]
(capacity); [76]-[133] (referencing only English cases in ruling on ostensible authority).
109. The indenture trustee makes each of these arguments. See Memorandum of Law in Support
of Defendants and Counterclaim Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 26-32, Petróleos de
Venez. v. MUFG Union Bank, 19 Civ. 10023 (KPF) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2020). By contrast, PDVSA’s
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Drafting a local-law carve-out involves a second difficulty, related to but
distinct from the first. The problem involves the difficulty in reaching
agreement on the scope of the carve-out. Consider the question of whether
the sovereign must pay restitution to investors who hold bonds that turn
out to be invalid. Should local law govern that issue? If so, how can the
choice-of-law clause be drafted to express this intent without creating new
interpretive problems (which the issuer might later exploit to reduce its
obligations)? Put in economic terms, any effort to draft a suitable local-law
carve-out will involve high specification costs. 110 But without careful
drafting, such a clause can introduce new risks into the loan.

III.

HOW SOVEREIGN BONDS ADDRESS GOVERNING LAW

To understand how these dynamics play out in practice, we constructed
a dataset of international sovereign bonds. We hand-coded the choice-oflaw provisions in bonds issued by a randomly-selected group of sovereign
nations. We also examined bonds issued by a randomly-selected group of
sub-sovereign borrowers, including cities, provinces, and state-owned
entities (e.g., PDVSA and Mexican state oil company Pemex). Debt issued
by such entities often benefits from an explicit or implicit state guarantee,
so one might expect to see parallel drafting practices in the two settings.
In total, we coded over 500 bonds: 386 sovereign bonds, issued by 96
sovereigns, plus an additional 163 bonds issued by 57 sub-sovereign entities.
Our coding relies on prospectuses and other sales documents, which
describe or reprint key bond terms. The dates of issuance range from 1976
to 2019, although most are recent and pertain to bonds that have not yet
matured. Because sovereign borrowers tend to use the same terms in each
bond issuance, and because we include bonds issued by nearly half of all
sovereign states, we are reasonably confident that the sample is
representative of sovereign bond contracts. We have less confidence in the
representativeness of the sub-sovereign samples and include it primarily for
comparison purposes.
None of the bonds include an expansive choice-of-law clause expressly
applying foreign law to disputes over the contract’s formation, validity, or
enforceability.111 Each clause begins with the generic template, stating only
that the designated law “governs” the contract or, occasionally, that the
brief characterizes the question as whether the borrower could give “valid consent” without legislative
approval and as whether the loan was illegally executed. Id. at 19, 31.
110. See generally Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115
YALE L.J. 814 (2006) (analyzing the choice of vague or precise contract terms as a trade-off between
investing at the front- or back-end of the contracting process); Christopher R. Drahozal & Erin O’Hara
O’Connor, Unbundling Procedure: Carve-Outs from Arbitration Clauses, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1945 (2015).
111. Such clauses do exist in other settings, but we did not find any in our dataset of sovereigns
and quasi sovereigns. For discussions of the other settings, see Coyle & Drahozal, supra note 36, at 341.
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contract is to be “governed by and interpreted in accordance with” the
designated law.112 The most significant variation in the clauses involved the
nature of any local-law carve-outs.
These carve-outs took various forms. The most common reserved
questions of “authorization and execution” for resolution under local law.
We previously gave an example from a Brazilian bond. 113 Here is one from
Argentine bonds issued in 2016:
The Bonds and the Indenture are governed by and construed in
accordance with the laws of the State of New York, except with
respect to the authorization and execution of the Bonds and the
Indenture by and on behalf of Argentina, which shall be governed
by the laws of Argentina.114
As discussed below, it is not clear what this authorization and execution
carve means.115 The apparent intent is to narrow the range of issues that will
be governed by foreign law. But by how much?
Another common carve-out expressly disclaims the intent to
incorporate the foreign jurisdiction’s conflict of laws rules. Here is an
example from a bond issued by Bolivia in 2012, which also includes the
authorization and execution carve-out:
The Notes and the Indenture will be governed by and interpreted
in accordance with the laws of the State of New York without
regard to any conflicts of law principles thereof that would require
the application of laws of a jurisdiction other than the State of New
York. However, matters concerning authorization and execution of
the Indenture and the Notes by Bolivia, as well as the enforcement
of any foreign judgment against Bolivia before Bolivian courts, will
be governed by the laws of Bolivia.116
Here, the point is not to reserve a subset of issues for resolution under
the sovereign’s own law but to eliminate the risk of renvoi—i.e., the scenario
in which a court applies the designated jurisdiction’s conflicts rules to select
a different law (potentially the sovereign’s own) to govern the contract.117
Potentially, a court might interpret this “conflicts carve-out” to forbid the
use of the sovereign’s local law to answer any question, even one asking only
whether the sovereign violated an applicable borrowing constraint in
112. Most courts interpret these provisions in the same way. See Coyle, supra note 24, at 656-61.
113. See supra p. 8.
114. Offering Memorandum, Republic of Argentina Series A-D Bonds at 209 (May 4, 2016) (on
file with authors).
115. Infra Part IV.
116. Prospectus, Estado Plurinacional De Bol. U.S. $500,000,000 5.95% Notes Due 2023 at 134
(Aug. 22, 2013).
117. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
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contracting the loan. The logic behind this interpretation is that the
sovereign’s local law becomes relevant only when selected through
application of conflicts rules, which the contract arguably forbids.118
Interpreted this way, the conflicts carve-out is functionally similar to an
expansive choice-of-law clause that expressly applies foreign law even to
questions of contract validity and enforceability. 119 However, recall that
most courts already interpret the generic choice-of-law clause to refer only
to the designated jurisdiction’s local law, not to its conflicts rules.120 To the
extent it merely restates this default rule, the conflicts carve-out is surplusage,
with no effect on the likelihood that a court will apply the sovereign’s local
law to any issue.121
The figure below reports the proportion of sovereign and sub-sovereign
bonds with carve-outs for questions of authorization and execution and
with the conflicts carve-out. To simplify, we include only bonds governed
by New York or English law, as there are relatively few international bonds
issued under other laws and thus few such bonds in our dataset. This leaves
us with a total of 376 sovereign and 154 sub-sovereign bonds. The figure
omits sub-sovereign bonds issued under English law, none of which
contained any carve-out.
Frequency of Carveouts in Sovereign and Sub-Sovereign Bonds
Issued Under NY and English Law
NY sovereign (n=224)

NY sub-sovereign (n=100)

English sovereign (n=152)

22.8%

Conflicts rules

5.7%
0.0%

71.0%

Execution

33.3%
2.6%

71.4%

Authorization

33.3%
2.6%

118. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
119. Again, there were no such clauses in our data.
120. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF L. § 187(3) (AM. L. INST. 1971); see also supra
notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
121. Cf. BUCHHEIT, supra note 73, at 131 (“[T]he addition of this phrase in the governing law
clause is not necessary . . . .”). Nevertheless, the clause is puzzling. Some conflicts rules are mandatory;
they purport to override any contractual choice of law. It is not clear whether the conflicts carve-out
purports to dispense with the application of these rules and, if so, whether a court will enforce that
choice.
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Two aspects of the data are immediately apparent. First, drafting
practices for sovereign and sub-sovereign bonds differ, at least in bonds
issued under New York law. Second, each carve-out appears more
frequently in bonds governed by New York law. In our data, the carve-outs
appear in a vanishingly small proportion of English law sovereign bonds,
and never in English-law sub-sovereign bonds.
Focusing on the difference between sovereign and sub-sovereign bonds
under New York law, part of the explanation may be that different law firms
tend to be involved in these deals. In our dataset, for instance, Cleary
Gottlieb appears most frequently as counsel for both sovereign (31.3%) and
sub-sovereign (47.3%) issuers of New York law bonds. But the secondary
players differ. On the sovereign side, Arnold & Porter (30.9%), Allen &
Overy (5.5%), and White & Case (5.0%) occupy the next three places in
terms of the proportion of issues handled. None of these three firms appear
as counsel for any appreciable number of sub-sovereign issuers. 122 To the
extent law firms favor document templates developed in house, this may
partly explain the difference we observe between sovereign and subsovereign issuers of New York law bonds.
Still, whatever role law firms or other intermediaries play in producing
different deal templates, there is no obvious functional reason why choice-oflaw clauses in sovereign bond deals should differ from those in subsovereign deals. The lack of standardization is especially odd in cases where,
from an economic perspective, the sovereign and sub-sovereign entity
represent essentially the same credit. For instance, take Venezuela and
PDVSA. Because the state oil company has historically generated nearly all
of the country’s foreign currency earnings, most observers would regard the
entities as similar if not identical credits. Yet drafting practices differ. For
example, a 30-year sovereign bond issued under New York law in 1997
includes carve-outs for questions of authorization and execution and also
excludes application of New York’s conflicts rules. We do not see these
carve-outs in PDVSA bonds issued under New York law.
Nor is there an obvious explanation for the different documentation
practices under New York and English law. Once again, there are
differences in the law firms that handle a high volume of deals in these

122. The law firms representing underwriters, fiscal agents, and other financial intermediaries also
differ between sovereign and sub-sovereign deals. Shearman & Sterling is a major player in both
markets, representing the financial intermediary in 18.9% of sovereign and 22.5% of sub-sovereign
issuances. But the firm that represents the largest share of underwriters on the sovereign side, Sullivan
& Cromwell (31.6%), plays a much smaller role in sub-sovereign issuances (10%). Likewise, Davis Polk,
which represents the largest proportion of underwriters in sub-sovereign deals (27.5%), plays a lesser
role in sovereign issuances (3.8%).
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markets.123 But we have not been able to identify any aspect of New York
law, nor any attribute of issuers in the New York market, that would explain
the greater tendency to use each of the carve-outs described above.124 To be
sure, the conflicts rules applicable in English courts are not identical to those
in New York. As an example, English conflicts law might be more likely to
point to the issuer’s local law to assess questions of capacity and related
matters, even when the contract includes a choice-of-law clause providing
for the application of foreign law.125 If so, issuers might see less need to
insist that the choice-of-law clause include a local-law carve-out. As noted,
however, New York law also usually looks to the issuer’s local law on such
questions.126 So we are skeptical that the different contracting practices are
due to differences in how courts in the two jurisdictions approach conflicts
questions.
Notably, not one contract attempts to define the meaning of
“authorization and execution” or to clarify the range of issues that fall under
these terms. As we have noted, it is not clear whether local law borrowing
constraints implicate the authorization or execution of a loan, the capacity
of the borrower, or something else. Nor is it clear whether, given a carveout for questions of authorization, an official’s apparent (and not merely
actual) authority is to be assessed under the sovereign’s local law. This
uncertainty introduces significant risk into these bonds, which we turn to in
Part IV.
In fact, far from clarifying the range of issues that will be governed by
the sovereign’s local law, a number of bonds introduce additional
uncertainty. Recall the Turkish bond referenced in the introduction, which
carves out not only questions of authorization and execution but “any other
matters required to be governed by the laws of Turkey.” This clause expands
123. For instance, Clearly Gottlieb appears most frequently as counsel for sovereign issuers in
New York (31.3%) but relatively infrequently in the English market (8.5%), where White & Case plays
the dominant role (21.7%). White & Case appears infrequently as issuer’s counsel in New York (5.0%).
124. At least at first cut, the difference does not seem attributable to the identity of the issuer, as
the same issuer will vary its documentation practices depending on which law is designated as governing.
Iceland, for instance, has included the authorization and execution carve-outs in bonds governed by
New York law and omitted them in bonds governed by English law.
125 . The Rome I Regulation excludes from its scope questions “governed by the law of
companies and other bodies, corporate or unincorporated,” leaving these to be determined by forum
conflicts rules. Regulation 593/2008, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008
on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome I), 2008 O.J. (L 177) at art. 1(2)(f). The
exclusion would apply to state-owned corporations and many other sub-sovereign issuers, and perhaps
by analogy to sovereign issuers. English conflicts rules would generally look to the law of the place of
incorporation to answer questions about capacity to contract and similar matters. See also J. G. COLLIER,
CONFLICT OF LAWS 208 (3d ed. 2001). Of course, that practice is also consistent with the internal
affairs doctrine under U.S. law.
126. See also BUCHHEIT, supra note 73, at 129 (“[T]he corporate authority of a party to enter into
the agreement or the due execution of the contract by a party are matters that will probably be
determined under the law of the place where the party is domiciled, not under the chosen governing
law of the contract.”).
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the local law carve-out to an unidentified, but potentially large, subset of
issues. We had expected it to be an aberration, but it is not. Although rare,
this additional carve-out for “other matters” appears in eight bonds issued
by five separate sovereigns under New York law (Sweden, South Africa,
Turkey, Philippines, and Finland). Here is an example from a 2002 bond
issued by Finland:
The securities are governed by and interpreted in accordance with
the law of the State of New York, except all matters governing
Finland’s authorization and execution of the securities and any
other matters required to be governed by the law of Finland. 127
These issuers have little in common, do not all use the same law firms
or underwriters, and have included the “other matters” carve-out in bonds
issued decades apart. The earliest use of this carve-out in our dataset is a
Swedish bond issued in 1980, the latest is a Turkish bond issued in 2019.
Even more than the carve-out for authorization and execution, this locallaw carve-out potentially undermines the protection supposedly offered by
an international loan.

IV.

CARVING OUT WHAT?

We focus here on the local-law carve-outs, for issues of authorization,
execution, and for “other matters.” Each carve-out reserves a subset of
issues for resolution under local law. But what subset? In theory, a choiceof-law clause should balance the sovereign’s desire to make and enforce its
own law with investors’ desire for protection against the risk that the
sovereign will exploit or create legal loopholes. As Part II explained, it is
essentially impossible to draft a choice-of-law clause that strikes this balance
with perfect clarity. Even a contract that expressly requires the application
of foreign law on all questions allows the sovereign to argue that foreign law
itself directs the tribunal to consult the sovereign’s local law. 128
All of this is to say that a choice-of-law clause cannot provide complete
ex ante certainty. But that fact does not explain why parties would introduce
ambiguous exceptions into a clause that seeks, at least in part, to minimize
investor risk. If ambiguity is unavoidable—that is, if it is too costly to
negotiate and draft an unambiguous local-law carve-out—then why not
simply use a generic choice-of-law clause designating foreign law to govern
the loan? That approach would at least economize on drafting and other
127. Prospectus, Republic of Fin. 4.75% Notes Due 2007 at 46 (Feb. 26, 2002).
128. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text; see also Ukr. v. Law Debenture Trust Corp.
[2018] EWCA (Civ) 2026 [37] QB 1121 (Eng.) (“As the Notes are governed by English law, this does
not affect their validity in the current proceedings unless the capacity of Ukraine to issue the notes is,
under English law, to be governed by those principles of Ukrainian law.”).
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front-end costs, while allowing the parties to tap into a relatively established
body of law to resolve any remaining disputes. 129 Yet, at least in bonds
governed by New York law, the local-law carve-outs used in sovereign
bonds introduce two important types of ambiguity.

A. “Authorization” and “Execution” Have no Clear Meaning
Begin with the carve-out for questions of authorization and execution.
These virtually always appear together—they did so all but once in our
data—so we address them jointly. The literature on drafting sovereign loan
contracts provides little clue as to their meaning. A prominent drafting guide
notes that sovereign borrowers sometimes request these carve-outs but does
not describe their meaning. 130 And our consultations with twenty
experienced practitioners in both New York in England left us equally
confused.131 Some expressed puzzlement, noting that the carve-out seemed
to impose unnecessary risk on investors. Others speculated as to the origin
of the different drafting practices in New York and England but did not
explain which issues the carve-out reserved for resolution under local law.
Still others wondered if the carve-out might have an established meaning in
the context of corporate debt. Although only one explicitly said this—a very
prominent English lawyer—all implied that the carve-out for authorization
and execution in bonds governed by New York law was surplusage that did
not change the meaning of the clause. Yet each noted the risk of confusion.
A judge might assign meaning to the carve-out, narrowing the range of
issues governed by foreign law, on the assumption that lawyers would not
add words unless they wanted to change meaning.
Some of our lawyer-respondents suggested that the carve-out may have
originated in corporate bond documents and then migrated into sovereign
bonds. We have found no evidence that this is the case. It seems that the
authorization and execution carve-out rarely if ever appears outside of
sovereign bonds. To our knowledge, John Coyle has conducted the most
extensive studies of choice-of-law clauses. Working mostly alone, but
occasionally with co-authors, he has studied clauses extracted from reported
129. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115
YALE L.J. 814 (2006) (analyzing the choice of vague or precise contract terms as a trade-off between
investing at the front- or back-end of the contracting process); Christopher R. Drahozal & Erin O’Hara
O’Connor, Unbundling Procedure: Carve-Outs from Arbitration Clauses, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1945 (2014)
(evaluating the costs of writing procedural rules into the contract). As a theoretical matter, parties
should limit their investment in drafting and negotiation when these costs exceed the benefits that can
be realize by further additions to the contract. Id. at 1949-50 (suggesting that parties do not contract
over procedure, beyond the selection between litigation and arbitration, because of the costs entailed
in identifying and bargaining over tailored procedural rules).
130. LEE C. BUCHHEIT, HOW TO NEGOTIATE EUROCURRENCY LOAN AGREEMENTS 132-33
(Rob Mannix ed., 2d ed. 2004).
131. We promised anonymity to respondents.
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cases, standardized form books, bond indentures, and international supply
agreements. 132 Professor Coyle reports that he has never encountered a
carve-out for authorization and execution in any of the contracts he had
studied.133 Nor do we find the carve-out in a separate sample of several
hundred commercial agreements compiled by one of us for a different
project.134 It is not that contracts outside the sovereign debt context never
refer to these concepts. For instance, one or both parties to a commercial
contract will sometimes represent that it is has taken all steps necessary for
“the authorization, execution, and delivery” of the contract. 135 But we have
found nothing to clarify the scope of issues that fall within these carve-outs,
nor have we found other examples in which these matters are excluded from
the scope of a choice-of-law clause.
As an example of the potential confusion, consider the litigation over
the $3 billion bond issued by Ukraine under English law. Ukraine disputed
the enforceability of the bond, arguing that the debt put the country over its
borrowing limit and violated procedural rules governing loan approval. To
date, neither the parties nor the courts have paid much attention to the text
of the choice-of-law clause, which does not appear in any of the judicial
opinions issued thus far. 136 The clause reads, in its entirety, “This Trust
Deed and any non-contractual obligations arising out of or in connection
with it are governed by English law.”137 Even this bare-bones clause left
132. See John F. Coyle, A Short History of the Choice-of-Law Clause, 91 COLO. L. REV. 1147; John F.
Coyle & Christopher R. Drahozal, An Empirical Study of Dispute Resolution Clauses in International Supply
Contracts, 52 VAND. J. TRANS’L L. 323 (2019); John F. Coyle & W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Interpreting
Contracts Without Context, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1673 (2018); John F. Coyle, Choice of Law Clauses in U.S.
Bond Indentures, 13 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 152 (2018); John F. Coyle, The Role of the CISG in U.S. Contract Practice:
An Empirical Study, 38 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 195 (2016).
133. E-mail from John Coyle, Professor of L., U.N.C. Sch. of L., to Mark Weidemaier, Professor
of L., U.N.C. Sch. of L., & Mitu Gulati, Professor of L., Duke U. Sch. of L. (May 15, 2020, 14:00 EST)
(on file with authors):
This may well be a choice-of-law issue that is sui generis to sovereign debt agreements. In all
my research, I have never before come across a carve out for “authorization and execution”
in a choice-of-law clause. Just to make sure I wasn’t misremembering, I ran a search through
(1) the 3000+ clauses I collected from published U.S. cases between 1880 and 2000; (2) the
300+ clauses from bond indentures pulled from SEC filings in 2016; and (3) the 100+
clauses that Chris Drahozal and I collected from international supply agreements in SEC
filings. This carve out appeared in exactly zero clauses in these datasets.
134. For a description of the sample, see W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Customized Procedure in Theory
and Reality, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1865, 1905-09 (2015).
135. See, e.g., Supply Agreement between Stellar Pharmaceuticals Inc. and Watson Pharma Inc.
Art. 4.2(c) (Dec 12, 2006) (on file with authors).
136. The Law Debenture Trust Corp. v. Ukr. [2017] EWHC 655 (Comm.); Ukr. v. Law Debenture
Trust Corp. [2018] EWCA (Civ) 2026.
137. Trust Deed Relating to U.S. $1,250,000,000 7.50 Per Cent Notes due 2023 ¶ 25.1 (on file
with authors); see also id. Sch. 1 p. 38 (“This Global Note and any non-contractual obligations arising
out of or in connection with it, are governed by, and shall be construed in accordance with, English
law.”).
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room for disagreement. For instance, Ukraine’s primary defense was that it
lacked capacity to incur the debt, and it argued that this question was to be
resolved under Ukrainian law.138 The English courts disagreed, ultimately
treating the question of capacity as governed by English law. 139 To the
extent Ukraine’s borrowing limits implicated the actual authority of state
officials, rather than the state’s capacity to borrow, the parties agreed that
Ukrainian law governed, and the indenture trustee conceded that Ukraine’s
officials were not actually authorized to approve the loan. 140 But this did not
help Ukraine, for the Court of Appeal ultimately ruled that state officials had
ostensible (apparent) authority to bind the state. It appears to have based
this holding entirely on English law.141
Might the result have been different if the Ukrainian bond had carved
out questions of authorization and execution for resolution under local law?
The carve-out is rare for English-law bonds, but does appear in a handful.
The literal text of the carve-out comfortably accommodates questions of
apparent as well as actual authority, although it need not be read so broadly.
Even the carve-out for questions of execution, without more, might be read
to encompass questions of apparent authority. That term is often
understood, more narrowly, as a reference to the rules governing signature
requirements and any other formalities necessary to conclude a contract.142
But lawyers have long been warned that “‘executed’ is a slippery word. Its
use is to be avoided except when accompanied by explanation.”143
It would not be hard for a sovereign to build a case for interpreting the
authorization and execution carve-out to encompass a wide range of matters.
For example, sovereign bond issuances are typically accompanied by
opinion letters in which lawyers affirm the legality of the loan under the
sovereign’s local law and under the foreign law designated as governing.
Although we cannot observe the opinion letters for the bonds in our
sample,144 a letter opining that a loan has been “duly executed” often covers
issues “not only of corporation law but also of agency law and contract
138. See Defense filed May 22, 2016, The Law Debenture Trust Corp. v. Ukr., High Court of
Justice (Queen’s Bench Division) FL-2016-000002, ¶ 47.
139. The Court of Appeal acknowledged that English law could instruct the court to apply
Ukrainian law but it did not look to Ukrainian law to resolve the dispute. The trial judge had also looked
to international law to define Ukraine’s capacity to borrow, but the Court of Appeal treated capacity
as purely a matter of domestic (English) law. See Ukr. v. Law Debenture Trust Corp. [2018] EWCA
(Civ) 2026 [37], [71]-[73].
140. The Law Debenture Trust Corp. v. Ukr. [2017] EWHC 655 (Comm) [136] (noting agreement
on the question of governing law); Ukr. v. Law Debenture Trust Corp. [2018] EWCA (Civ) 2026 [76]
(noting the trustee’s concession on the question of actual authority).
141. Ukr. v. Law Debenture Trust Corp. [2018] EWCA (Civ) 2026 [76]-[133].
142. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
143. WILLIAM R. ANSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CONTRACT 26 (Arthur L. Corbin ed., 3d
am. ed. 1919).
144. These letters are privileged, so we are not able to examine them in connection with any of
the loans in our sample.
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law.”145 Certainly the lawyers will affirm that the borrower’s agents have
actual authority to bind it to the loan.146 This assurance matters to investors,
who will be displeased to learn that their prospects for enforcing the loan
depend on a tribunal’s willingness to accept a theory of apparent
authority.147 This overarching concern with ensuring that the borrower is
bound by the acts of its officials might be taken to imply that the
authorization and execution carve-out extends to all questions related to that
concern, including questions of apparent authority.
Our conversations with experienced practitioners did little to dispel our
confusion. Although none were willing to go on record, several agreed that
the authorization and execution carve-out, if it had been present in the
Ukraine case, might have changed the outcome.148 None thought this the
inevitable outcome, but almost all thought it possible. To be sure, there are
also reasonable contrary interpretations. For example, the carve-out might
simply apply local law to a narrow set of questions concerning the need for
formalities such as a signature and the actual (not apparent) authority of
government officials. But so interpreted, the additional words about
execution and authorization are essentially meaningless, and courts generally
take the position that words are used to add meaning. This gives the
sovereign room to argue for an expansive interpretation of the carve-out.149

B. The “Other Matters” Carve-Out is a Trap for the Unwary
We do not see how sovereigns or investors benefit from the ambiguous
carve-out for matters of authorization and execution. But that carve-out is
a model of clarity compared to the carve-out for “other matters.” Using the
Turkish bond as an example, recall that this clause provides that questions
of authorization, execution, “and any other matters required to be governed
by the laws of Turkey . . . will be governed by the laws of Turkey.”150 As
noted, the clause raises but fails to answer a fundamental question: Required
by what law?151
145. DONALD W. GLAZER ET AL., GLAZER AND FITZGIBBON ON LEGAL OPINIONS:
DRAFTING, INTERPRETING, AND SUPPORTING CLOSING OPINIONS IN BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS
280 (3d ed. 2008).
146. Id.
147. Report of the Tri-Bar Opinion Committee: Third Party “Closing” Opinions, 53 BUS. LAW. 591, 65354 (1998) (the opinion letter on authorization, execution, and delivery “is intended to respond to the
understandable concern of the opinion recipient that those who executed the agreement had actual
and not merely apparent authority to act on the Company’s behalf.”).
148. This assumes, of course, that Ukrainian law would reject the theory that government officials
had apparent authority to approve the loan.
149. See JFE Steel Corp. v. ICI Am., Inc., 797 F. Supp. 2d 452, 469 (D. Del. 2011).
150. Prospectus Supplement to Prospectus dated February 18, 2004, Republic of Turk., U.S.,
$750,000,000 (June 24, 2004).
151. See supra p. 10.
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One possibility is that the sovereign’s local law defines the range of
issues required to be governed by its law. So understood, the “other matters”
exception threatens to eviscerate the protection ostensibly offered by the
designation of foreign law in an international bond. The reason is not just
that the sovereign’s law may be unfamiliar to investors and may later turn
out to require the application of local law in unexpected contexts. It is that,
in a financial crisis, the sovereign will have incentives to create such rules if
they do not exist already.
For instance, consider a sovereign in financial crisis, which, anticipating
a debt restructuring, enacts legislation mandating the application of local law
to all disputes over the validity and enforceability of creditor claims. Such a
step might seem opportunistic, even in bad faith. But there are plausible,
good faith justifications for legislation of this sort. Some debt restructurings
are relatively straightforward and involve only few debt instruments and
classes of private creditor (e.g., loans and banks; bonds and bondholders).152
Others are more complicated and involve a large and diverse universe of
creditors. In such cases, a primary task is to identify valid claims and to
reconcile the amounts that the restructuring will recognize. 153 For instance,
trade creditors may inflate the value of their claims in anticipation that the
restructuring will impose a discount. The reconciliation process seeks to
prevent this. It can also provide a forum for examining legal weaknesses in
creditors’ claims. During the restructuring of Iraqi debt that began in 2004,
a key issue was how to treat oil contracts previously negotiated by Saddam
Hussein’s government, which were subject to a number of legal
challenges. 154 In any restructuring of Venezuelan and PDVSA debt, the
reconciliation process will have to resolve disputes over the enforceability
of debt instruments with dramatically inflated face values, which the
obligors issued to favored creditors.155 Creditors who will not participate in
the reconciliation process or abide by its results can seek to enforce their
rights in any available judicial or arbitral forum.
The effort to validate and quantify creditor claims is made significantly
more complicated when the claims are subject to many different legal
regimes. This is all the more true when the sovereign asserts a common
152. Lee C. Buchheit & Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt Restructuring and U.S. Executive Power, 14 CAP.
MKTS. L.J. 114 (2019).
153. See, e.g., Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Framework for a Formal Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism,
37 MICH. J. INT’L L. 57, 92 (2015).
154. Although the challenges were often presented as implicating the relatively untested doctrine
of odious debt, see, e.g., Adam Feibelman, Equitable Subordination, Fraudulent Transfer, and Sovereign Debt,
70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 171 (2007), they typically also implicate well-established doctrines of
municipal law, see id.; Lee C. Buchheit, Mitu Gulati & Robert B. Thompson, The Dilemma of Odious Debts,
56 DUKE L.J. 1201, 1230-50 (2007).
155. See generally Susan Block-Lieb & W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Lenders’ Roles and Responsibilities in
Sovereign Debt Markets, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 1589, 1603.
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objection to multiple types of claim. For instance, consider the scenario in
which the sovereign’s present government believes that corrupt members
of the former government unlawfully approved the issuance of multiple
instruments, each governed by a different law, to favored creditors. 156
Current officials are not likely to see any merit in distinguishing among these
creditors. The easiest way to ensure equivalent treatment, while giving effect
to the sovereign’s own policies, would be to assess the validity of each
instrument under the sovereign’s own law. Whatever else one might say
about that impulse, it hardly demonstrates bad faith on the sovereign’s
part.157
In the typical case, the sovereign could not insist on comparable
treatment, nor could it insist on any particular substantive outcome.
Creditors’ rights would be determined by the law of the jurisdiction
designated in the instrument, which might well insist on enforcing the
obligation notwithstanding any violation of the sovereign’s local law. But all
bets are off when the instrument’s choice-of-law law clause includes the
“other matters” exception. The sovereign could enact a law requiring that
the validity of each instrument be assessed under its local law. It could also
enact a law declaring each instrument invalid, or it could leave that decision
to (presumably compliant) local courts in an effort to minimize the legal risk
created by this strategy.158
Of course, an alternative understanding of “other matters” carve-out is
possible. The foregoing interpretation posits that the sovereign’s own
conflicts rules define the set of issues to be resolved in accordance with its
local law. But perhaps the carve-out instead means to incorporate any
mandatory conflicts rules of the foreign jurisdiction specified in the choiceof-law clause (or of the forum, if these differ). As an example, consider the
internal affairs rule, a conflict of laws principle directing courts to apply the
law of the place of incorporation to questions concerning the relations
156. This is the Venezuelan scenario. Although U.S. sanctions currently block any restructuring,
guidelines issued by the interim government—which has no practical power but is recognized by the
U.S. as the legitimate government of Venezuela—envision a reconciliation process to examine
“questionable claims,” including claims issued with inflated face values and claims “procured or tainted
by demands of corruption allegedly committed by officials in the Chávez/Maduro regimes.” See
Memorandum from Off. of the Special Att’y Gen. of the Bolivarian Republic of Venez., Guidelines
for the Renegotiation of the Chávez/Maduro Era Legacy Public External Debt, at 2 (July 1, 2019).
157. Indeed, it is arguably consistent with creditors’ expectations, as it is common for creditors
to accept comparable treatment during a restructuring notwithstanding formal differences in their legal
entitlements. In Iraq, for instance, the past due interest owed to commercial claimants was calculated
at a uniform rate even though some creditors had negotiated instruments with much higher penalty
rates of interest. See Lee C. Buchheit & Mitu Gulati, Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing, 73 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 91-92 (2010).
158. The fact that creditors can bring suit in foreign courts would somewhat constrain these
impulses. But at least as a formal matter, the extent of the constraint would also be within the
sovereign’s control. For instance, it could pass a law requiring that its own law be used to assess the
legality of retroactive changes to governing law.
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among the corporation, its shareholders, directors, officers, and agents.159
The rule is often understood to require application of the law of the place
of incorporation even when the contract’s choice-of-law clause specifies
another law. 160 The internal affairs doctrine is not directly applicable to
contracts involving foreign states. But it is an example of how a choice-oflaw clause might select a body of law that will itself require application of
some other law (likely, in this context, to be the sovereign’s local law).
Perhaps the “other matters” exception simply means to acknowledge the
possibility of such rules and to clarify that, when they exist, the choice-oflaw clause does not purport to contract around them. So understood, a New
York-law bond with the “other matters” carve-out means only to confirm
that, if New York law happens to require the application of the sovereign’s
local law, this result is consistent with the parties’ intent.
This interpretation is plausible, but it ignores the purpose of a local-law
carve-out, which is to reserve for resolution under local law issues that have
fundamental governance import to the sovereign.161 Thus, it is usually the
sovereign that bargains for a carve-out for authorization, execution, and the
like.162 It is the sovereign’s law, not New York or other foreign law, that will
constrain borrowing in ways that the terms “authorization” and “execution”
do not neatly encompass. For example, the borrower’s law may impose
detailed requirements for the formation of government contracts.163 And it
is the sovereign’s law that can best identify which of these requirements
serve important governance purposes. Given all this, it would be odd for
the sovereign to rely on the conflicts rules of a foreign jurisdiction to define
the range of issues that will be governed by its local law.
However one thinks this interpretive question should be resolved, it is
surprising to see such a fundamental ambiguity in a contract term that exists
mostly to protect investors against legal risk. When we put the question to
experienced sovereign debt practitioners, a number of them agreed that the
clause created significant risk for investors. One wondered how a lawyer
could write a legal opinion letter affirming the enforceability of a bond
without knowing which matters were in fact required to be governed by the
sovereign’s local law. To borrow a poker analogy, others saw the ambiguity
we mentioned and raised us. They drew our attention to similar ambiguities
159. See Edgar v. MTE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
302 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1971).
160. See, e.g., Jennifer J. Johnson, Risky Business: Choice-of-Law and the Unincorporated Entity, 1 J.
SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 249, 288 (1997).
161. See supra Part II.B.
162. LEE C. BUCHHEIT, HOW TO NEGOTIATE EUROCURRENCY LOAN AGREEMENTS 133 (Rob
Mannix ed., 2d ed. 2004).
163. Hector Mairal, Issues Arising from the Legal and Constitutional Validity of the Debt Under the Debtor's
Own Law, in JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DEBT OBLIGATIONS 119, 119 (David
Bradlow & Daniel Sassoon eds., 1987).
OF L. §
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that they had recently noticed in other sovereign bond provisions. For
example, in some sovereign bonds the issuer waives sovereign immunity
only “to the extent that the Republic is lawfully entitled to do so.”164 The
language apparently is intended to acknowledge that the sovereign’s law
constraints its ability to waive immunity and that, in consequence, an
investor’s enforcement rights may be limited.165 But such language might
also enable the government to retroactively narrow the scope of its waiver.

V.

CONCLUSION

As academics who study contracts, we find it hard to make sense of the
frequent use of these ambiguous, local-law carve-outs. The fact of ambiguity
itself is not the puzzle. Contracts often include vague or ambiguous terms,
which effectively defer the provision of detail until later (when it can be
supplied by a court or other tribunal if the parties cannot agree). The puzzle
is that parties would introduce ambiguity on such an important question.
The purpose of an international bond, after all, is to protect investors
from risks lurking in the sovereign’s local law, including the risk that this law
will change. Although forum conflicts rules may insist on applying the
sovereign’s local law to a subset of issues, the authorization and execution
carve-out invites a tribunal to expand this subset. To the extent a tribunal
accepts the invitation, the protection offered by an international bond
diminishes accordingly. In effect, the authorization and execution carve-out
delegates to courts or arbitrators the authority to decide, ex post, just how
much protection an international bond offers against legal risk.
The “other matters” carve-out is even stranger. As with the
authorization and execution carve-out, a tribunal might interpret this carveout narrowly, effectively rendering it meaningless. But investors have no
assurance of this result. And the broader interpretation delegates to the
sovereign itself the authority to decide, ex post, which issues will be
governed by its local law. Because the sovereign also decides the content of
that law, the “other matters” carve-out potentially exposes investors to the
risk that retroactive legal change will undermine their rights. That is precisely
164. See Offering Circular for Republic of Croatia, 3% Bonds due 2027 at 29 (Mar. 16, 2017) (on
file with authors).
165. For example, under U.S. law, a broad waiver would entitle the investor to attach and
potentially force an execution sale on any sovereign asset “used for a commercial activity in the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(1) (2012). With a narrower waiver, U.S. law would allow attachment only
if an asset met this requirement and also “is or was used for the commercial activity upon which the
claim is based.” 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2) (2012). In other jurisdictions, a broad waiver of immunity might
also allow an investor to seize property even when not used for commercial purposes. Finally, the
sovereign’s law may restrict its ability to waive immunity with regard to assets located within its own
territory (although here the right to attach property, if it exists, is of mostly theoretical value, as few
domestic courts are willing and empowered to oversee such a process).
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the risk that a foreign law bond seeks to avoid. We do not mean to suggest
these results are guaranteed. In fact, a tribunal might interpret both carveouts narrowly to avoid these seemingly odd results. But it is puzzling to see
ambiguities of this sort, which undermine a central purpose of the contract.
We return now to the question raised in the Introduction, which
involved litigation over the grant of collateral in the PDVSA 2020 bond.
Lawyers for the sovereign say that the grant of collateral was invalid, since
the proper legislative approval required under local Venezuelan law was not
obtained. Lawyers for the creditors emphasize that, even though the carveout for authorization and execution appears in some Venezuelan sovereign
bonds, it is absent from the choice-of-law clause in the PDVSA 2020 bonds.
They emphasize the omission, arguing that it demonstrates that the PDVSA
2020 bonds were specially designed to avoid having Venezuelan law govern
such matters. The district judge sided with the creditors, although without
giving special emphasis to the omission of the authorization and execution
carve-out. With respect to the conflict of laws question, the district judge
ruled that New York’s conflicts rules designated New York law to govern
the validity of the PDVSA 2020 bonds. Most relevant here, the judge
reasoned that, because the bonds called for performance (i.e., payment) in
New York, that state’s law should determine the validity of the bonds. 166
In our view, the district judge was right not to assign much significance
to the omission of the authorization and execution carve-out from the
PDVSA 2020 bond. Our examination of sovereign bonds and discussions
with practitioners lead us to believe that the carve-out is mere surplusage.
Although the authorization and execution carve-out appears in nearly threequarters of the New York law bonds in our sample, we hesitate to assign
meaning to the presence (or absence) of that language. The contrary
inference would make the carve-out into a trap for investors, even the most
informed of which could not know in advance precisely which issues would
be governed by the sovereign’s local law. (Although not relevant to the
PDVSA 2020 bonds, we have the same reaction to the “other matters”
carve-out.) But words that the transactional lawyers think to be a pretty gloss
on the obvious can become weapons in the hands of litigators, especially
given the judicial tendency to assume that added words mean added
meaning.
However, we are hesitant to accept the district judge’s implication that,
because the bonds were to be paid in New York, that state’s law should
“control[] this dispute in its entirety.” 167 Among other reasons for our
hesitancy, recall that New York conflicts rules generally look to the law
166. Petroleos de Venez. S.A. v. MUFG Union Bank, No. 19 Civ. 10023, at 60-62 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
16, 2020).
167. Id. at 62.
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where an illegal act was committed in order to determine whether a violation
of law occurred.168 Although the PDVSA 2020 bonds call for payment in
New York, and much of the pre-issuance negotiation took place in New
York, the failure to seek National Assembly approval occurred in Venezuela,
as did all decisions related to whether to seek such approval. It is not selfevident that the violation of Venezuelan law, if one occurred, took place in
New York rather than Venezuela. Our hesitancy is deepened by the fact that
New York law has nothing whatsoever to say about the legal constraints on
borrowing by the Venezuelan government and its instrumentalities. Thus, it
seems more appropriate to look to Venezuelan law to establish whether the
PDVSA 2020 bond was issued in violation of governing law.
Despite our reluctance to accept this aspect of the district judge’s
reasoning, the ultimate ruling in favor of the indenture trustee is plausible.
Although cases like Korea Life arguably suggest that Venezuelan law should
determine whether a legal violation occurred, one can reasonably argue that
New York law should determine the effect of a violation. Although we do
not think the answer is clear under New York law, the outcome will likely
depend on whether investors could reasonably rely on contemporaneous
assurances as to the loan’s legality, including representations to that effect
by PDVSA in the transaction documents.
Whatever the ultimate outcome of the PDVSA 2020 bond dispute, it is
clear that the choice-of-law clauses in sovereign bonds merit more attention.
Governments appear increasingly willing to contest the enforceability of
public debt (e.g., Venezuela, Ukraine, Mozambique, Puerto Rico), and the
economic fallout of the Covid-19 crisis may encourage further challenges.
The principles at stake are important, pitting laws designed to encourage
fiscal discipline against investors’ legitimate desire for protection against
legal risk. In resolving that conflict of principles, it would help tribunals to
have contracts that clearly expressed the parties’ intent.

168. See Korea Life Ins. Co. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 269 F. Supp. 2d 424, 438 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
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